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While anti-abortion activists have been successful in pushing to restrict access to abortion
across the USA, reproductive rights activists have been mobilizing across Latin America
to push for the easement of strict anti-abortion policies. These opposing directions of
travel have renewed interest in which human rights arguments would best support the
expansion of access to abortion in Latin America. To date, progress in this area has
mostly relied on understanding that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment requires states to allow abortions in the direst of circumstances. However,
the vast majority of women in the region who seek abortions do not qualify for the
small exemptions contained in the law. Activists looking to expand abortion provisions
beyond the cruelty paradigm therefore need to nd arguments that can stand rm in a
generally conservative Latin American region. In this search, the Inter-American System
could, somewhat surprisingly, provide keys to constructing a new discourse surrounding
reproductive rights based on a nuanced understanding of structural discrimination and a
willingness to visibilise the su ering of women.
KEYWORDS: Inter-American Human Rights System, Reproductive Rights, Abortion,
Latin America
‘ . . . the Court underlines that su ering is a personal experience for each individ-
ual and, in that sense, will depend on multiple factors that make each person an
individual being’.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Some years ago, I published an article where I criticized the lack of gender justice in
the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘the Inter-American Court’
or ‘the Court’). I theorized that the poor case law in terms of women’s rights was
due to a lack of gender-aware judges on the bench for most years that the Court had
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1 Case of I.V. v Bolivia IACtHR Series C 329 (2016) at para 267. My translation.
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operated.2 At the time of publishing that piece, change was beginning to manifest aer
the election of a woman judge who was a gender expert and much has happened in the
past decade in terms of the gender content of rulings.3 Recent case law has made huge
strides towards recognizing the gendered aspects of human rights violations including
why these violations occur and how to repair them.
The case loadof the Inter-AmericanCourtwas, until recently, dominatedbypolitical
violence and mass atrocity but as Latin American states have made their way slowly
towards democracy, both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (‘the
Inter-AmericanCommission’ or ‘theCommission’) and the Inter-AmericanCourt have
seen an increase in petitions and cases that refer to the consequences of social inequality.
The Court has, most notably, made rulings and handed down advisory opinions on the
rights of women,4 the rights ofmigrants and asylum seekers,5 LGBTQ rights,6 patients’
2 Palacios Zuloaga, ‘The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 17
Texas Journal of Women and the Law 227.
3 See in general: Abi-Mershed, ‘Due Diligence and the Fight against Gender-Based Violence in the Inter-
American system’ in Carin Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women om
Violence (2008) 127; Jaichand and O’Connell, ‘Bringing It Home: The Inter-American System and State
Obligations Using a Gender Approach Regionally to Address Women’s Rights Violations Domestically’
(2010) 3 Inter-American and EuropeanHumanRights Journal 49; Rubio-Martin and Sandoval, ‘Engendering
the Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton
Field Judgment’ (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly, 1062; Celorio, ‘The Rights of Women in the Inter-
American SystemofHumanRights: CurrentOpportunities andChallenges in Standard-Setting’ (2011) 65
University of Miami Law Review 819; Schönsteiner, Beltrán y Puga and Lovera, ‘Reections on the Human
Rights Challenges of Consolidating Democracies: Recent Developments in the Inter-American System of
HumanRights’ (2011) 11HumanRights LawReview 362; Beltran y Puga, ‘ParadigmaticChanges inGender
Justice: The Advancement of Reproductive Rights in International Human Rights Law’ (2012) 3Creighton
International and Comparative Law Journal 158; Acosta López, ‘TheCotton Field Case: Gender Perspective
and Feminist Theories in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 21 Revista Colombiana de
Derecho Internacional 17; O’Connell, ‘Engendering Reproductive Rights in the Inter-American System’ in
Lalor, Mills, Sánchez García and Haste (eds), Gender, Sexuality and Social Justice: What’s Law Got to Do
With It? (2016) 58; Pires, ‘Procreative Autonomy, Gender Equality and Right to Life: The Decision of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica’ (2017) 13 Revista Direito GV
1007; Contesse, ‘Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Inter-American Human Rights Law’ (2019)
44 North Carolina Journal of International Law 353; Saez, ‘In the Right Direction: Family Diversity in the
Inter-American System of Human Rights’ (2019) 44North Carolina Journal of International Law 317.
4 Case of González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico IACtHR Series C 205 (2009); Case of Fernández Ortega
et al. v Mexico IACtHR Series C 215 (2010); Case of Rosendo Cantu et al. v Mexico IACtHR Series C 216
(2010); Case of Atala Ri o et al. v Chile IACtHR Series C 239 (2012); Case of Artavia Murillo et al.v Costa
Rica IACtHR Series C 257 (2012); Case of Espinoza González v Peru IACtHR Series C 289 (2014); Case
of Veliz Franco et al. v Guatemala IACtHR Series C 277 (2014); Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v Guatemala
IACtHR Series C 307 (2015); Case of I.V. v Bolivia supra n 1.
5 OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants IACtHR Series A 18 (2003); OC-
21/14,Rights andGuarantees of Children in the Context ofMigration and/or inNeed of International Protection
IACtHR Series A 21 (2014); OC-25/18, The Institution of Asylum, and its Recognition as a Human Right
under the Inter-American System of Protection (interpretation and scope of Articles 5, 22(7) and 22(8) in relation
to Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights) IACtHR Series A 25 (2018).
6 Atala Ri o et al. v Chile, supra n 4;Case ofDuque vColombia IACtHRSeriesC310 (2016);Case of Flor Freire
v Ecuador IACtHR Series C 315 (2016); OC-24/17, Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-Discrimination
with Regard to Same-Sex Couples. State Obligations in Relation to Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights
Deriving om a Relationship between Same-Sex Couples (interpretation and scope of Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2),







/hrlr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/hrlr/ngab014/6288575 by guest on 02 July 2021
Can the Inter-American System Accommodate Abortion Rights? • 3
rights7 and sexual and reproductive rights.8 At the same time that this jurisprudential
turn was happening in the Court, on the ground Latin American reproductive rights
activists continued to organize against some of the most restrictive abortion laws on
the planet.9 While Guyana, Cuba, Uruguay, Mexico City, Oaxaca and most recently
Argentina allow for abortion on demand during a dened period of time,10 most
Latin American and Caribbean states allow it only in a small number of very closely
dened circumstances. Most commonly across the region, abortion is allowed where
the pregnancy threatens the pregnant woman’s life,11 where the foetus has a fatal
abnormality or when the pregnancy is the result of rape. Some states allow abortions
where the health of the pregnant woman is at risk.12 All forms of abortion are banned
in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Suriname and Haiti.13
Despite strict regulations, rates of illegal abortion remain high across all states that do
not allow for abortion on demand.14 Across the region, illegal abortion entails serious
repercussions including death or serious injury for those that undergo the procedure,
and prosecution and imprisonment for those that survive it and those that perform it.15
7 Case of PobleteVilches vChile IACtHRSeriesC349 (2018);Case ofCuscul Pivaral et al. vGuatemala IACtHR
Series C 359 (2018).
8 Artavia Murillo et al. v Costa Rica, supra n 4; I.V. v Bolivia, supra n 1.
9 Kelly, ‘Latin America’s Fight to Legalise Abortion: The Key Battlegrounds’ The Guardian, 9 August 2018;
Brigida, ‘Abortion Rights Activists Have Made Strides in Latin America. Is a Backlash Coming?’ World
Politics Review, 8 January 2019; Center for Reproductive Rights, Abortion and Reproductive Rights in
Latin America: Implications for Democracy (2015), available at www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civi
cactions.net/les/documents/IAD9794%20Repro%20Rights_web.pdf [last accessed 04 March 2021];
Reif, Sexual and Reproductive Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean: Where are we Now? The Dialogue,
13 December 2017, available at www.thedialogue.org/analysis/sexual-reproductive-rights-in-latin-ameri
ca-the-caribbean-where-are-we-now/ [last accessed 4March 2021].
10 Cuba decriminalised abortion in 1965 (and made it more accessible in 1979), Guyana decriminalized
abortion in 1995, Mexico City did so in 2007, Uruguay in 2012, Oaxaca in 2019 and Argentina in 2020.
11 While most pregnant people are women, some pregnant people do not identify as women. My use of the
term ‘women’ and the term ‘pregnant women’ should not be understood as excluding the fact that transmen
and non-binary persons can become pregnant and can also therefore be negatively a ected by the lack of
safe and legal abortion services.
12 E.g. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru allow for abortion to preserve physical health. Colombia’s
ConstitutionalCourtRulingC-355/06of 2006 allows for abortion topreserve the physical ormental health
of the pregnant person.
13 WorldHealthOrganization, ‘GlobalAbortionPoliciesDatabase’ available at https://abortion-policies.srhr.
org/ [last accessed 4March 2021]; Center for Reproductive Rights, ‘TheWorld’s Abortion Laws’ available
at https://reproductiverights.org/worldabortionlaws [last accessed 4March 2021]; Guttmacher Institute,
‘Fact Sheet: Abortion in Latin America and the Caribbean’ available at https://www.guttmacher.org/site
s/default/les/factsheet/ib_aww-latin-america.pdf [last accessed 4March 2021].
14 TheGuttmacher Institute estimates the incidence of Abortion in Latin American to be 44 per 1000women
aged 15–44, Guttmacher Institute, Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access (2018)
at 9, available at https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/les/report_pdf/abortion-worldwide-2017.
pdf [last accessed 4March 2021]; see also ibid. at 9–11.
15 From 2010–14 76.4 per cent of abortions performed in Latin America and the Caribbean were unsafe,
Ganatra et al., ‘Global, regional, and subregional classication of abortions by safety, 2010–14: estimates
from a Bayesian hierarchical model’ (2017) 390 The Lancet 2372 at 2376; the Guttmacher Institute
estimates that ‘In 2014, at least 10 per cent of all maternal deaths (or 900 deaths) in Latin America and
the Caribbean were from unsafe abortion’. Guttmacher Institute, supra n 13; See also Paxman et al.. ‘The
Clandestine Epidemic: ThePractice ofUnsafe Abortion in LatinAmerica’ (1993) 24 Studies in Family Plan-
ning 205; Kulczycki, ‘Abortion in Latin America: Changes in Practice, GrowingConict, and Recent Policy
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Recent advocacy e orts have centred on two objectives: (i) to relax the total bans on
abortion, including e orts to secure the release of women imprisoned for the crime of
abortion and (ii) where only so-called therapeutic abortion exists, to open up the law
to allow for abortion on demand. While both objectives seek to achieve the relaxing of
abortion laws, the human rights arguments used to support them have been di erent.
There seems to be an understanding that forcing a woman to continue a pregnancy that
could threaten her life or her health, or is the product of rape, or to carry an unviable
foetus to term, would be cruel, inhuman and degrading. However, to force a woman
to continue with a pregnancy in any other circumstances would not rise to the level
of cruelty required to trigger a violation of this right. Therefore, the defence of the
right to abortion on demand, where it exists in the world, has generally relied upon the
idea that banning it would violate the right to autonomy which in many jurisdictions
resides within the right to privacy.16 Undoubtedly, the refusal to understand most
forcedpregnancy as cruel needs tobe interrogated for at least two reasons. First, because
on the part of legislators it exemplies the lack of willingness to recognize the shape
and the intensity of women’s pain.17 Second because from a practical point of view,
basing access to abortion on the right to privacy has le it vulnerable to attacks from
anti-abortion groups, which in the USA have resulted in dramatic curtailments of the
provision of sexual health services.18
In this article, I examine the human rights arguments available to activists who
seek to expand access to abortion in a Latin American region that is generally hostile
to sexual and reproductive rights. I will look at whether there is reason to follow the
privacy doctrine that has su ered enormous setbacks in the USA and I will ultimately
argue that the Latin American context requires the deployment of legal arguments
that have a stronger footing in the region. I will argue that, despite the wording of the
Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations, Chile, 14 June 2004, CAT/C/CR/32/5 at para 6.
(j); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘Concluding observations on the
combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of El Salvador’ 9 March 2017, CEDAW/C/SLV/CO/8–9 at
paras 36–37.
16 In Canada, since R. v Morgentaler, (1988) 1 SCR 30, the right is generally understood to be located within
the right to security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
17 There is signicant amount of literature that details the feminist critique of the construction of torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and specically that holds that denial of abortion should be
considered cruel, inhuman and degrading. Examples of the former include: Charlesworth, Chinkin and
Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 613
at 627–631; Charlesworth and Chinkin,The Boundaries of International Law (2000) at 231–237; Copelon,
‘Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture’ (1994) 25 Columbia Human
Rights Law Review 291; Byrnes, ‘The Convention Against Torture’ in Askin and Koenig (eds) Women
and International Human Rights Law II (1999) 183. Examples of the latter include: Sifris, Reproductive
Freedom,Torture and InternationalHumanRights: Challenging theMasculinisation of Torture (2016); Zureick,
‘(En)gendering Su ering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment’
(2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 99; Mayall, Afulukwe and Thomasen, ‘Reproductive Rights
Violations as Torture or Ill-Treatment’ in Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Gender
Perspectives on Torture: Law and Practice (2018) 265 at 273–276; Isabella Moore ‘Indignity in unwanted
pregnancy: denial of abortion as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ (2019) 23 International Journal
of Human Rights 1010.
18 Center for Reproductive Rights, Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: United States
of America, Reproductive Health, Rights, and Justice (2020) at paras 1–4 and 27–35, available
at https://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/les/2020-01/3rd%20US%20UPR%20-%20repro%20ri
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American Convention on Human Rights that recognizes life before birth, both Inter-
American system organs—the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American
Court—have provided key jurisprudence in the areas of sexual and reproductive rights,
health, life, integrity and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and equality, which
can support an approach that holds that forcing someone to be pregnant when they do
not want to be pregnant is a violation of their human rights. While there is a signicant
body of literature from the global north that suggests that access to abortion services
on demand should be based on the prohibitions of discrimination and ill treatment,19
the present article examines how those theoretical arguments can be contextualised
and applied by advocates on the ground in Latin America. In doing so, it provides
a jurisprudential map towards decriminalisation based on the case law of the Inter-
American system, which has demonstrated that it is uniquely able to conceptualise
and validate human su ering. In this way I will build upon the literature that criticizes
the foundation of sexual and reproductive rights on the doctrine of privacy and I will
contribute to the discussion onhow to provide themost robust protection of sexual and
reproductive rights in a way that pays close attention to context.
2. ABORTIONRIGHTS INTHEUSAAND INLATINAMERICA: ATALEOF
TWOARCS
It is interesting toobservehow the trajectories of abortion rights in theUSAand inLatin
America are currently running in opposite directions. In the USA, where abortion on
demand has been legal (subject to time, viability and other considerations) since Roe v
Wade in 1973, we are currently observing a large and e ective push-back of these rights
by conservative activist groups who are bolstered by the recent appointment to the US
Supreme Court of three Justices who are widely perceived to oppose abortion. These
groups are lobbying conservative state governments to enact reforms that are restrictive
of access to abortion in order to force reproductive rights activists to challenge those
reforms in court. They then hope to use the appeals process to push these cases all the
way to the Supreme Court, where they will challenge the Roe v Wade precedent with a
view to overturning it.20
Conversely, the enormous inuence of the Catholic Church and the growing inu-
ence of Evangelical Protestant churches, along with decades of government by author-
itarian regimes tied to conservative sectors of society, have meant that Latin American
states are generally hostile to the idea of allowing access to abortion. Six of the 26
states in the world where abortion is forbidden under any circumstances are located
in the region.21 However, social and political movements that advocate for the easing
of abortion laws have gained traction in recent years, with some notable successes.22
19 For literature regarding denial of abortion services as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment see supra n
17; as discrimination seeCook,Dickens and Fathalla,ReproductiveHealth andHumanRights (2008) at 349,
351; Siegel, ‘Reasoning From the Body: AHistorical Perspective on Abortion Regulation andQuestions of
Equal Protection’ (1991) 44 Stanford Law Review 261; Bader Ginsburg, ‘Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, (1985) 63North Carolina Law Review 375; MacKinnon, ‘Privacy
v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983)’ in Feminism Unmodied, (1987) at 93.
20 Center for Reproductive Rights, supra n 18 at para 7.
21 Center for Reproductive Rights, supra n 13.
22 Note, for example, the relaxing of strict anti-abortion laws inMexico City, Uruguay, Oaxaca and Argentina
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However, with few exceptions, this success has been tied to the discourse of cruelty
and has hit a wall when it comes to abortion on demand. In many areas of life and the
law, Latin America has tended to follow trends set by its neighbour to the north. When
visualizing advocacy strategies for achieving the legalization of abortion on demand,
this tendency is problematic not least because the privacy argument has proven to be
vulnerable in the face of the anti-abortion discourse that exists in both regions and that
is based on the right to life of the foetus.
A. USA and the Privacy Doctrine
Roe v Wade, the landmark precedent that legalized abortion on demand in the USA in
1973, was decided on the issue of privacy. The plainti  in the case was a 21-year-old
womanwhowas denied an abortion inTexas, where abortionwas only legal where nec-
essary to save the life of the pregnantwoman.23Themainholdingof the SupremeCourt
was that privacy, understood to be included in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution, was broad enough to encompass the right of a
pregnantwoman to terminate her pregnancywithout state interference.24TheSupreme
Court also recognized that the state of Texas had a legitimate interest in banning
abortion, but that the weight of that interest varied across the length of the pregnancy,
meaning in practice that the decision to have an abortion should not be challenged by
the state during the rst trimester of the pregnancy.25 Further case law surrounding
access to safe and legal abortion in the USA has centred on the nuances of the state’s
ability to regulate abortion provision but the core nding of Roe, namely that the right
to decide to have an abortion is constitutionally protected under the right to privacy,
has held strong so far.26 State restrictions on abortion have largely either attempted
to shorten the length of time during which an abortion can be performed legally or
attempted to place obstacles in the path of access, by requiring abortion providers to
comply with varied regulations before carrying out abortions. Laws examined by the
US Supreme Court have required, for example, abortion providers to wait 24 hours
between a request and the procedure,27 to obtain the consent of a spouse or parent,28
doctors who perform abortions to have admission privileges at local hospitals,29 or
abortion clinics to comply with strict building regulations applicable to hospitals.30
The constitutionality of these measures is dependent on whether the courts deem that
23 Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113. The plainti  gave birth before the Supreme Court decision was handed down
and the child was given up for adoption.
24 Ibid.The inclusion of reproductive rights in theUSConstitution dates back to 1965 inGriswoldwhere a law
prohibiting contraceptionwas found to be unconstitutional because it violated the right to so-calledmarital
privacy. Amajority of Justices found that there was a right to privacy in the US Constitution, although they
did not all agree on where specically to locate it.Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479.
25 Roe v Wade supra n 23 at para 3(a)(b). Planned Parenthood v Casey later replaced the trimester framework
with a frameworkbasedon the viability of the foetus and replaced the strict scrutiny standardwith a standard
that requires laws restricting abortion to not impose anundueburdenonwomen seeking abortions.Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 U.S. 833.
26 See e.g. ibid.;Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
27 Planned Parenthood v Casey, supra n 25.
28 Ibid.
29 Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt supra n 26; June Medical Services, LLC v Russo 591 U.S. ___ (2020).
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they place an undue burden on the enjoyment of a constitutional right.31 However,
since the conrmation of Supreme Court Justices that are perceived as anti-abortion,
several US states that are hostile to abortion rights ‘are enacting increasingly extreme
and unconstitutional abortion bans and restrictions in an e ort to ask the Supreme
Court to overturn or decimate Roe’.32
The ruling in Roe was undoubtedly pivotal for reproductive rights. It legalized
abortion on demand in theUSAduring the rst trimester of pregnancy. It also served as
a beacon for the imagination of activists around the world, o ering a strategic pathway
to legalization in states that did not allow for legal abortion in all circumstances. In the
USA it had a particular virtue of locating abortion rights within a right to privacy in a
society that values autonomy and the restriction of the role of the state in the a airs of
individuals. The discursive message was one requiring the state to not interfere in an
issue that was not of its concern.
In the decades following the ruling in Roe, feminists and other scholars have criti-
cized the locationof abortion rightswithin the areaof privacy.Many feminists see access
to abortion as an equality issue, not only because pregnancy is a burden that is (mostly)
carried by women33 but also because in patriarchal societies women do not control
the exercise of their own sexuality in the same way that men do and therefore being
forced to carry the consequences of that sexuality is manifestly unfair.34 Furthermore,
the focus on privacy and on limiting the ability of the state to interfere in the decision to
abort reinforces the public/private paradigm that allows the state to abstain from action
and therefore not provide or fund reproductive healthcare in the way that it does other
forms of healthcare.35 The privacy/choice model also contributes to understanding
reproductive rights as amatter that a ects individuals, thereby invisibilising the fact that
the restriction of these rights a ects a broad social group in a structural way.36
More recently there has been a swing towards understanding the issue of access
to abortion within the broader scope of reproductive justice which rejects the pro-
choice/pro-life paradigmand links decisions on reproduction tobroader issues of social
inequality that inuence whether or not a pregnant person has the social (including
economic) capacity to carry a pregnancy to term without it causing unjust harm in
their lives.37Reproductive justicewould, therefore, examine thebroader issues a ecting
access to reproductive healthcare and parenting instead of reducing the issue to a
snapshot in time of the decision to abort.
31 Planned Parenthood v Casey, supra n 25.
32 Center for Reproductive Rights, supra n 18 at para 27.
33 Recall that not all pregnant people identify as women.
34 See supra n 19 for scholarship on abortion as an issue of equality.
35 Harris v McRae 448,448U.S. 297 where the US Supreme Court found that states were not required to fund
abortions not covered by federal funds and that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of federal
funds topay for abortion services, didnot violate theUSConstitution. See alsoWebster vReproductiveHealth
Services 492 U.S. 490.
36 Bader Ginsburg, supra n 19; Siegel, ‘Siegel, J., Concurring’ in Balkin (ed), What Roe Should Have Said
(2005) 63; Sunstein, ‘Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion
and Surrogacy)’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1 at 36–41.
37 Luna and Luker, ‘Reproductive Justice’ (2013) 9 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 327; Ross and
Solinger,Reproductive Justice: An Introduction (2017); Smith, ‘Beyond Pro-Choice Versus Pro-Life:Women
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Discursively, the privacy doctrine has two major aws that have contributed to the
steady erosion of the right to access safe and legal abortion in the USA. First, the
narrative of choice as the way to operationalize privacy does not stand strongly against
the counter-narrative of life. Second, the focus on abortion as a choice does not allow
us to visibilise or to understand the su ering of women forced to continue pregnancies
they do not want to continue. I will examine both of these weaknesses in turn.
First, certainly, one of the greatest achievements of the anti-abortion movement
was the ability to frame the discussion surrounding abortion as a discussion about
life, specically, about the value of human life. In establishing themselves as ‘pro-life’
and reproductive rights activists as ‘pro-choice’, they managed to reduce discussion
surrounding an incredibly complex social dynamic to a simple binary. This binary
became about identity and was closely tied to religious and political aliations in a
society that was becoming increasingly polarized by the simplication of social issues
moulded for swi consumption.38 In this way, our position on access to safe and legal
abortion became about whether or not we valued life; not every life, just unborn life
which, within this religiously infused narrative, is more vulnerable and more valuable
as it is untainted by sin. Valuing life is not an exclusively religious endeavour; all
domestic legal systems protect life and the protection of life is paramount in all human
rights discourse. However, the success of the anti-abortion activist movement was in
reducing the term ‘pro-life’ or ‘pro-vida’ to the exclusive realmof abortion. In posing this
narrative dichotomy (you are either pro-life or you are pro-choice) ‘choice’ is always a
morally inferior option. Choice, as conceived by the anti-abortion discourse, is devoid
of moral substance; it is about convenience. Furthermore, in narratively framing access
to abortion as an issue about life, they are able to equate abortion with death and,
considering that it is motivated by convenience, they are able to hold that abortion is
murder.Thisnarrative, though simple, hasproven tobedevastatingly e ective indriving
political and legal change in post RoeUSA.39
The second major defect of the privacy argument in the discursive arena is that it
does not allow for the visibilization of the su ering caused by the denial of abortion
services. In conceptualizing access to abortion as only a privacy issue, the denial of
abortion is seen as an intrusion on the ability of a pregnant person to exercise an
autonomous choice, nothing more. If that intrusion is carried out to save a human
life, then it appears easy to justify. Denying a choice, conceived in abstract terms, says
nothing about pain. In fact, the abortion debate as it stands in the USA does not
generally speak to the very real su ering that pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood
bring about for thosewho are unwilling, unsupported or unprepared to go throughwith
it. There are social and economic sanctions placed upon pregnancy and motherhood
that are not contemplated in the life/choice paradigm, neither are the physical and
psychological e ects of carrying an unwanted pregnancy. Aer childbirth (a physically
traumatic event in all cases) the only options available to those who did not want to
38 For a discussion of the role of abortion in US political discourse see: Hinkson Craig and O’Brien, Abortion
and American Politics (1993); Francome, Abortion in the USA and the UK, (2004) at Chapter 6; McBride
Stetson, ‘US Abortion Debates 1959–1998: TheWomen’s Movement Holds On’ inMcBride Stetson (ed),
Abortion Politics, Women’s Movements, and the Democratic State (2001) 247; Adell Cook, Jelen and Wilcox,
Between Two Absolutes: Public Opinion and The Politics of Abortion (2018).
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be pregnant are to raise the child themselves or to resort to adoption. Both of these
scenarios can involve enormous psychological su ering for the woman, not tomention
the child, and all of this su ering remains invisible to the life/choice paradigm.40
In practice, the grounding of abortion in the right to privacy, where the obligation
of the authorities is to merely not intervene, has justied the refusal of the federal
government as well as states to fund its provision, making it inaccessible to poor
women.41 This understanding of access to abortion as a matter of personal choice, as
opposed to a human right, has also allowed the US government to use its foreign policy
to require organisations in receipt of aid to refrain fromeven advocating for abortion law
reform.42 Domestically, the states that are hostile to abortion but that cannot outlaw
abortion (because of the Roe precedent) have instead resorted to passing laws that
regulate and restrict the provision of abortion services to such an extent as to make
themunavailable in practice. This has forced reproductive rights organisations to spend
their resources opposing these laws in Court. The Center for Reproductive Rights
(CRR), in a submission made to the UN Human Rights Council in the context of the
Universal PeriodicReviewof theUSA, asserted that ‘in 2019, states . . . enacted 46 laws
restricting abortion access’ including ‘unconstitutional pre-viability bans on abortion,
such as laws banning abortion around six weeks of pregnancy’.43 The CRR contends
that the purpose of these restrictive laws is ‘to ask the Supreme Court to overturn or
decimate Roe’.44 While the abortion-as-privacy doctrine was initially strong and while
it has the virtue of simplicity, it is apparent that its weaknesses have been exploited to
such an extent that a change of discourse appears necessary if access to abortion is to
endure.
B. Latin America and the Caribbean: the Limits of Cruelty
Conversely, su ering is at the centre of the legalization of abortion in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean. The only states where abortion on demand is available are
Cuba, Guyana, Uruguay and Argentina;45 every other state restricts the availability of
abortion services; six states ban it completely under any circumstance. The remaining
states, those that allow for some so-called therapeutic abortions, do so because of the
cruelty associated with forcing certain, very well-dened pregnancies to continue. In
Latin America, the focus of this article, life is the main discursive value at play in the
abortion debate. The strength of this position has much to do with the enormous
political importance of the Catholic Church—and more recently newer evangelical
Protestant churches—and their centuries-long ability to permeate political discourse
throughout the region. Catholic doctrine regarding gender and sexuality, particularly
regarding gender roles and reproduction, can be seen throughout Latin American law
40 See infra n 136.
41 Harris v McRae supra n 35.
42 Starrs, ‘TheTrumpGlobalGagRule: AnAttack onUSFamily Planning andGlobalHealth Aid’ (2017) 389
The Lancet 485.
43 Center for Reproductive Rights, supra n 18 at para 28, and regarding the e orts to restrict access to abortion
services, see paras 27–35.
44 Ibid. at para 27.
45 In Mexico where criminal conduct is regulated by state law, Mexico City and Oaxaca have also decrimi-
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and politics.46 Indeed, the American Convention on Human Rights famously requires
states to protect life ‘by law and, in general, from the moment of conception’.47
During years of authoritarian rule, the Catholic Church was oen able to mediate
and to lobby for human rights, as it was respected by all sides of social conicts. As a
result, during the most repressive years of dictatorial rule, the Church was oen the
onlyNGOthat could advocate for human rights,48 and it was thus able to set the agenda
for human rights advocacy for decades. Therefore, while the Church focused its voice
on denouncing murder, torture and arbitrary detention, and lent a voice to assisting
migrants and the poor, the rights orwomen andof LGBTQpeopleweremostly ignored,
and in the case of reproductive rights, actively opposed. The end of authoritarian
regimes and the growing use of electronic communication are leading to a decrease in
the overall number of government-sponsored atrocities, to greater freedom tomobilise
and to greater possibilities for international networking for human rights advocates in
Latin America. This greater freedomhas allowed reproductive rights activists to pursue
the relaxation of laws restricting abortion, with di ering levels of success. For example,
in 2006 Colombia moved from a total ban on all abortions to allowing abortions in the
event of risk to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, malformation of,
or risk to, the foetus, and in the event that thepregnancy is due to rapeor incest.Uruguay
decriminalized abortion in the rst 14 weeks of pregnancy in 2012. In several other
states in the region decriminalization is nally being talked about at di erent levels:
in grassroots mobilization, in law schools and medical schools, in court and even in
congress. This is, in itself, a change from an era where abortion was simply not spoken
of outside of church.
However, despite the newfound openness to talk about it, two recent examples
illustrate the complexities of decriminalization in Latin America. In Chile, laws crim-
inalising abortion were brought in by the military regime and were among the strictest
in the world. I myself distinctly recall sitting in my criminal law class at the University
of Chile in the nineties and learning that if my pregnancy were to threaten my life, I
was constitutionally obligated to die. The total ban was enforced oen, largely because
medical professionals were legally required to report women who came to hospital
su ering complications aer obtaining illegal abortions.49 I remember watching the
police raid clandestine abortion clinics live on breakfast television. Aer the fall of the
regime, women’s rights activists worked tirelessly to lobby for the relaxation of laws
46 See, in general, Htun, Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce and the Family Under Latin American Dictatorships
and Democracies, (2003) at Chapter 6; Shephard, The ‘Double Discourse’ on Sexual and Reproductive
Rights in Latin America: The Chasm between Public Policy and Private Actions’ (2000) 4 Health and
Human Rights 110 at 113.
47 Article 4.1 American Convention on Human Rights 1969, 1144 UNTS 123.
48 Cleary, The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America (1997) at 1–25 (regarding the role of the Catholic
Church in the resistance to Pinochet’s regime), at 3 (regardingChile aer the coup of 1973, stating ‘InChile
citizens formed organizations rapidly through churches, which were the one institution le standing with
their civil rights largely intact’). See also 64–5, 92.
49 Casas-Becerra, ‘Women Prosecuted and Imprisoned for Abortion in Chile’ (1997) 5 Reproductive Health
Matters, 29; Casas and Vivaldi, ‘Abortion in Chile: the Practice under a Restrictive Regime’ (2014)
22 Reproductive Health Matters 70 at 76–77 (regarding mandatory reporting of abortion by healthcare
providers); UNCommittee against Torture, supra n 15 at para. 6(j) (regarding withholding of medical care
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banning divorce and the legalization of emergency contraception. It was a slow and
arduous process but both objectives were ultimately achieved. In their e ort to broaden
and stabilise access to the morning aer pill they found an ally in Michelle Bachelet, a
medical doctor, who was at the time in her rst term as president.50
Shortly aer being elected to the presidency for the second time in 2014, Bachelet’s
government announced that it would propose a bill that allowed for abortion in three
situations: if the life of the pregnant womanwas at risk, in cases of fatal foetal abnormal-
ity or where the pregnancy was the result of rape. Passage of the bill through Congress
galvanized the attention of the public domestically and garnered much international
attention too. The relaxation of the abortion ban, which had broad public support in
socially conservative and deeply religious Chile, had been unthinkable only a short
number of years earlier. The bill passed through both houses of the centre-le congress
and was quickly challenged by right wing lawmakers before the state’s Constitutional
Court. During the Constitutional case 176 amicus curiae briefs were presented by
concerned third parties.51 Ultimately, aer applying a proportionality test to the rights
of pregnant women vis á vis the rights of the unborn, the Constitutional Court allowed
most of the bill to continue and become law. It declared unconstitutional the section
that rejected the ability of medical professionals to declare themselves conscientious
objectors to abortive procedures.52
What is most interesting in the case of the Chilean easement was the ability of
reproductive rights advocates to shi the focus of the discourse surrounding abortion
from one cruelty (the murder of the unborn child) to another (forcing women in
desperate situations to continue with pregnancies that are causing them pain). It was
their ability to frame the issue in terms of victimhood (as opposed to choice) that
created a crack in a discursive wall that had seemed impenetrable.53 This framing
50 For an analysis of the diculties in achieving access to reproductive healthcare in Chile see Brito Peña,
Cid Aguayo and Donoso Orellana, ‘Ruling the Womb: The Sexual and Reproductive Struggle during the
Bachelet Administration’ (2012) 39 Latin American Perspectives 145;Maira, Casas and Vivaldi, ‘Abortion in
Chile: The Long Road to Legalization and its Slow Implementation’ (2019) 21 Health and Human Rights
121.For adescriptionof theprocess to legalise themorning aerpill seeCasas, LaSagade laAnticoncepción
de Emergencia en Chile: Avances y Desafíos, (2008) 2 FLACSO Serie de Documentos Electrónicos.
51 I led a teamof students fromtheUniversityofEssex inpresenting anamicusbrief onChile’s obligations in the
eld of abortion under international human rights law. For a list of amicus briefs seeTribunalConstitucional
Chile, Rol 3729 available at <https://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/expediente [last accessed 9 March
2021].
52 Ibid.
53 For example, Dides Castilla and Fernandez write about themobilization of domestic civil society organisa-
tions that, among other strategies ‘raised cases of women who had asked the Chilean state for abortions’.
Dides Castillo and Fernández, ‘Aborto en Chile: Avances en Derechos Humanos’ (2018) 43 Revista de
Bioética y Derecho 61 at 67, my translation. Piquer Romo describes Amnesty International Chile’s campaign
titled ‘Chile Does Not ProtectWomen’, part of which involved publicising testimonial narratives of women
whohadbeen inoneof the three situations coveredby thebill andhadbeendenied abortions. PiquerRomo,
‘La Épica de Una Oportunidad Mínima’ in Casas Becerra and Maira Vargas (eds), Aborto en Tres Causales
en Chile: Lecturas del Proceso de Despenalización (2019) 233 at 240. Bachelet herself, in the rst presidential
address of her second termsaid: ‘We routinelyhearnewsofwomenwho risk their lives byhaving clandestine
abortions, which undoubtedly mark their lives with pain and anguish. And we have recently been informed
of a woman who is in critical condition. And every abortion in this country is a sign that as a society we
have arrived late, because prevention has not worked’. Maira Vargas and Carrera Ferrer (quoting Michele
Bachelet) in ‘Estrategias Feministas para la Despenalización del Aborto enChile. La experiencia de laMesa
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of decriminalisation as an act of mercy was widely accepted by the community and
therefore it was a discourse that politicians wary of losing votes could get behind.54 The
endorsement of a large bloc of progressive politicians was key to passing the bill. The
number of women who will benet from the new law is very small. Even among other
Latin American states, the Chilean law is still among the strictest, as the threat to the
pregnant woman must be death and not the broader concept of health. Still, the crack
is something that activists can and will work with because, as I argue below, it allows
social imagination to begin to perceive that bans on reproductive healthcare can and do
cause serious harm.55
The second example that illustrates the obstacles in the way of decriminalization is
the case of Argentina where abortion was, until very recently, only legal where the life
or the health of the pregnant woman was at risk (and there was no other way to avoid
this risk) or where the pregnancy was the result of rape or was the result of an indecent
assault against a womanwith intellectual disabilities or intellectual impairment.56 As in
all Latin American countries, in Argentina the rates of illegal abortion remained very
high despite the ban and as a result, the levels of maternal mortality and morbidity
resulting fromunregulated andunsafe abortionwere someof the highest in theworld.57
In 2018, a bill to decriminalize abortion up to 14 weeks of gestation got almost all
the way through Congress, only to be narrowly defeated in the Senate. The bill was
fruit of grassroots mobilization by reproductive rights activists that had rallied against
the deaths of women caused by unsafe abortions and was ercely opposed by anti-
abortionmovements, including theCatholic Church, that relied on the overriding right
to life of the unborn to justify their opposition.58 Argentinianmedia reported that high-
ranking bishops lobbied members of congress to oppose the bill59 and two days aer
the bill was approved by the lower house, the Pope himself, during an event at the
Vatican, compared abortion based on foetal malformation to Nazi e orts to achieve
racial purity.60
54 Robledo Hoecker, Valdés Echenique and Viera Bernal, ‘Proceso de despenalización de la interrupción del
embarazo en tres causales de Chile.Mirada desde la salud’ in Casas Becerra andMaira Vargas (eds), ibid. 27
at 40, n 17 (referring to a survey of public opinion carried out in 2017where over 70 per cent of respondents
stated they would decriminalise abortion in the three situations covered by the bill).
55 Chilean feminist authors recognized the reluctance of the feminist movement to support such a limited bill
of decriminalization. Those that did were moved by the idea that this would be an opening which would
lead to further liberalization down the road. Piquer Romo, supra n 53 at 238–241;Maira Vargas andCarrera
Ferrer supra n 53 at 182–183.
56 Articles 85–88, Código Penal de la Nación Argentina (1921) (Amended by Ley 11.179 of 1984).
57 Romero, Abalos, and Ramos, ‘La Situación de la Mortalidad Materna en Argentina y el Objetivo de
Desarrollo del Milenio 5’ (2013) 8 Hoja Informativa Observatorio de Salud Sexual y Reproductiva at 6
(demonstrating that from 2007–2011 death resulting from abortion was the leading cause of maternal
mortality in Argentina).
58 Booth, Argentina Votes on Bill to Legalise Abortion up to 14Weeks, (2018) 391The Lancet 21; Sherwood,
‘Argentina Abortion Defeat Shows Enduring Power of Catholic Church’ The Guardian, 9 August 2018;
Editorial: Catholic Church v. Women’s Rights in Argentina, (2018) 392 The Lancet 532; Sutton, and
Borland, ‘Abortion and Human Rights for Women in Argentina’ (2019) 40 Frontiers: A Journal of Women
Studies 27.
59 Rubin, ‘Debate Histórico. Aborto: la Iglesia, el Actor Clave que Logró Frenar la Ley’ El Clarín, 9 August
2018.
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The year aer the bill was rejected by Congress, the Argentine electorate voted in
a new president, who had promised to back a new bill, again decriminalising abortions
performedbefore14weeksof gestation.With the support of thenewgovernment, along
with its legislators, the bill nally passed shortly before the publication of this article.61
Just 22 days later, in what was widely understood as a reaction to the Argentinian
decriminalisation vote, the Honduran Congress voted to require a supermajority of
two-thirds to alter the constitutional ban on abortion, e ectively rendering it virtually
impossible that legal access to abortion could be achieved by electing legislators that
would favour that move.62
Prior to the very recent Argentine decriminalisation vote, the cases of Chile and
Argentina were emblematic of one of the major issues faced by the decriminalization
movement in Latin America, namely that there is a disconnect between the arguments
used to successfully lobby for access to abortion in the most dire circumstances and
arguments used to justify abortion on demand. Indeed, the decriminalisation of abor-
tion in Argentina came aer decades of struggle by women’s rights advocates and
remains a distant target for most Latin American women. For those interested in for-
mulating legal strategies to broaden access to reproductive healthcare in Latin America
to be successful, it becomes imperative to understand the discourse surrounding gender
and motherhood in the region. Specically, why is it possible to relax the ironclad pro-
tection of unborn life in some cases andnot in others andwhat can be done to formulate
a decriminalization strategy that takes into account the idiosyncrasies of the region?
In Latin America family is tremendously important. Several domestic constitu-
tions63 and indeed the American Convention on Human Rights hold that family is the
fundamental nucleus of society.64 This is likely the result of how important organised
religion is in the region with Catholic and Evangelical churches attracting followers
from across political and class spectrums. While much diversity exists between Latin
American nations, and while younger generations are bucking traditional trends—as
evidenced by the broad public support of e orts to widen access to abortion in Chile
and Argentina, it remains undeniable that in general the region is socially conservative,
and that religious doctrine remains a strong inuence for the generation that currently
wields political and judicial power. In Latin America Catholic—and, to an increasing
extent, Evangelical Christian—doctrine is strong, and it teaches that sex should be
aimed at reproduction within a heterosexual marriage.65 Furthermore, it teaches that
motherhood is a woman’s natural destiny.66 This translates to a social expectation that
women become mothers and—for women—motherhood is the logical consequence
of sex. Furthermore, women are understood to be mothers as soon as they become
pregnant, so awoman’s attitude towards a foetus is equated to their attitude towards her
child.67 Inmost families, the role of themother as nurturer is central.Given that the role
61 Ley 27,610, Acceso a la Interrupción Voluntaria del Embarazo, 30 December 2020.
62 Booth, ‘Honduras Changes Constitution to Ban Abortion’ 397 The Lancet 360.
63 See Article 42, Constitución Política de Colombia; Article 1, Constitución Política de Chile; Article 67,
Constitución Política del Ecuador; Article 51, Constitución Política de Costa Rica.
64 American Convention on Human Rights, supra n 47 at Article 17.1.
65 See e.g. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, (1995).
66 See e.g. Pope John Paul II,Mulieris Dignitatem (1988).
67 For an examination ofCatholic doctrine regarding the role of women, including in sex andmotherhood and
with regards to abortion, see Lemaitre, ‘Catholic Constitutionalism on Sex, Women and the Beginning of
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of mother is assigned as soon as conception occurs, the archetype of the badmother—
the mother who rejects her child—therefore extends to pregnant women who wish to
abort.
A couple of examples from the case law of the Inter-American Court can help to
illustrate this social construction of motherhood and its consequences. In the Artavia
Murillo case, which dealt with the ban on IVF procedures by Costa Rica, the Court
received expert testimony that explained the harm that the ban caused to infertile
women because ‘motherhood has been assigned to women as an essential part of their
gender identity, transformed into their destiny’.68 A fewyears earlier, in the ruling on the
caseof theCastroCastroprison—where the state ofPeru attacked thewomen’swingof a
prison to targetmembers of Shining Path—Brazilian JudgeAntonioCançadoTrindade
described in a concurring opinion the abuse su ered by women in the following terms:
something sacred that has been violated in the present case: the project as well
as the experience of maternity. Maternity, which must be surrounded by special
cares, respect, and acknowledgment . . . was violated in the present case in a
brutal form . . . In even another dimension, many of the women who survived
the bombing of the Prison of Castro Castro . . . have not been able to be
mothers yet, since . . . they have since then used all their existential time in
searching for truth and justice. Thus, we are facing here amaternity that has been
denied or postponed (a damage to a life project), forced upon them by the cruel
circumstances.69
LatinAmerica is also characterisedby a cultural trait foundall over theworld: the inabil-
ity to perceive the su ering of women as real. Structural oppression of womenhasmade
our physical and psychological pain invisible. The su ering of women is ubiquitous,
normalised and invisible in most societies around the world. It is oen trivialized (for
example, domestic violence legislation establishes a separate, conciliatory procedure for
abuse thatwould otherwise be considered criminal assault70), questioned (for example,
attitudes towards rape and sexual assault involve an interrogationof the behaviour of the
victim71) and ignored (for example, studies demonstrate that medical professionals are
more reticent to prescribe pain relievingmedication towomen than they are tomen72).
The Inter-American Court has itself, once again, provided examples of this attitude in
its past case law. In theCaballeroDelgado and Santana case theCourt received testimony
68 Artavia Murillo et al. v Costa Rica, supra n 4 at para 298.
69 Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, IACtHR Series C 160 (2006), concurring op. J Cançado
Trindade at paras 61–63. See also, Palacios Zuloaga, supra n 2 at 243–244.
70 See, in general,Macaulay, ‘Judicialising and (de)CriminalisingDomesticViolence inLatinAmerica’ (2006)
5 Social Policy and Society 103.
71 Contreras et al., ‘Sexual violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A desk review’ Sexual Violence
Research Initiative/Pan American Health Organization (2010) at 41–42, available at https://www.pa
ho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2010/sexual_violence_LA_Caribbean_e.pdf [last accessed 12 March 2021];
McGowan, ‘Chilean Anti-Rape Anthem Becomes International Feminist Phenomenon’ The Guardian 6
December 2019.
72 Calderone, ‘The Inuence of Gender on the Frequency of Pain and Sedative Medication Administered to
Postoperative Patients’ (1990) 23 Sex Roles 713; Samulowitz et al., ‘BraveMen’ and ‘EmotionalWomen’: A
Theory-Guided Literature Review on Gender Bias in Health Care and Gendered Norms towards Patients
with Chronic Pain’ (2018) Pain Research and Management 1 at 5, 9–10; Ho mann and Tarzian, ‘The Girl
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of the forced nudity of a woman prisoner but found no evidence of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.73 In Loayza Tamayo the Court acknowledged all of the victim’s
claims of abuse except her rape, which it held to a higher probative standard.74
These two social understandings of womanhood—the woman as a mother and the
inability of society to properly grasp the gravity of women’s pain—go a long way to
explaining why, in the majority of Latin American states, the ban on abortion has been
relaxed for a small group ofwomenbut not for themajority. In short, the social narrative
states that the woman whose life is threatened and the woman who is carrying a fatally
abnormal foetus have not rejected their children; they have merely been placed by fate
in a heart-breaking situation. Thewomanwho is pregnant as a result of rape did nothing
wrong (she did not choose to have sex) and should not be reminded of her rape forever
by being forced to carry and then raise the child of her rapist. All other women who
seek abortion chose to have sex, becamemothers, only to reject their children. The rst
three groups ofwomendeserve compassion and the ability to end their pregnancies, the
last group deserves neither.While feminists ultimately aim to change these attitudes, in
the short andmedium term, advocacy strategies designed to broaden access to safe and
legal abortion in Latin Americamust be constructed with careful attention to the social
understandings described above, if they have any chance of garnering enough support
to succeed.
3. SEXUALANDREPRODUCTIVERIGHTS INTHE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM: THE STORY SOFAR
Ifwe are to assess how the Inter-AmericanSystemhasprotected sexual and reproductive
rights, and ultimately if this protection can be extended to safe and legal abortion, we
need to rst consider the American Convention on Human Rights and the Baby Boy
case. However, the story certainly does not end there, and the past een years have
seen the Systemmake enormous strides in gender justice and in the realm of sexual and
reproductive rights. I argue that these developments have created a tipping point in the
jurisprudence of the Systemorganswhich should be taken into account by reproductive
rights advocates seeking strategic avenues to advance the right to free and legal access
to abortion services.
A. The American Convention andBaby Boy
The American Convention onHuman Rights recognizes the right to life in its Article 4
in the following terms:
Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected
by law and, in general, from themoment of conception.Noone shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.75
73 PalaciosZuloaga, supra n2 at 275–7 (referencingCaballeroDelgado andSantana vColombia, IACtHRSeries
C 22 (1995) at paras 36, 38–9, 53 (f).
74 Ibid. at 275–7 (referencing Loayza-Tamayo v Peru, IACtHR Series C 33 at para 58.
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The American Convention is the only major general human rights treaty in the world
to require states to protect the life of the unborn. For this reason, it was invoked
by anti-abortion activists in 1977 when presenting a petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights against the USA. The case became known as Baby
Boy v the USA and was the rst time that the system was called upon to determine
whether abortion constituted a violation of the right to life.76 The case revolved around
the acquittal on appeal of a doctor in Massachusetts who performed an abortion in
the months following the decision in Roe v Wade. The petitioners claimed (among
other things) that this refusal to convict the doctor for manslaughter, based on the Roe
precedent, was in violation of Baby Boy’s right to life. The USA is not a party to the
AmericanConvention and could thus only be held to the standards set in the American
Declaration on the Rights andDuties ofMan, which does not include a similar prenatal
life clause. However, the petitioners claimed that the American Convention should be
used to clarify the content of the right to life contained in the American Declaration.77
The Commission responded only to the claim regarding the right to prenatal life,
and in doing so provided a detailed study of the travaux preparatoires regarding the
formulation of the right to life in both theDeclaration and theConvention. It explained
that reference to prenatal life was deliberately excluded from dras of the Declaration
in order to not place states that allowed for abortion in some cases immediately into
incompliance. At the time, 13 states and territories in the region allowed for termina-
tions in some circumstances.78 Similarly, the Commission explained that the travaux of
the Convention demonstrated that while the protection of prenatal life was important
for the draers, the words ‘in general’ were inserted before thewords ‘from themoment
of conception’ to allow for ratication from states where abortion was legal in some
circumstances.79 For these reasons the Commission concluded that the formulation of
both the Declaration and the Convention was never intended to limit the availability of
abortion and found against the petitioners. 80
TheBaby Boy case, decided in 1981, remains the system’s key piece of jurisprudence
in terms of whether or not abortion violates the right to life of the unborn. There are,
however, other areas in the broader eld of sexual and reproductive rights where the
system organs have established important case law that becomes relevant to strategic
litigation in favour of broader abortion access.
B. Forced Sterilisation and the Legality of In Vitro Fertilisation
The sterilisation of women as a way to limit women’s reproduction, including where
the woman is part of a group that the state deems undesirable, has unfortunately
been a practice of Latin American states.81 The rst case to come before the system
76 Case 2141,White and Potter (‘Baby Boy’) v the USA, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R, Report No 23/81 (1981).
77 Ibid. at para 2.
78 Ibid. at para 19, note that the numeral is missing from the text but is presumed to exist where the letters
start over.
79 Ibid. at para 25.
80 Ibid. at para 30.
81 Amnesty International, The State as a Catalyst for Violence against Women: Violence against women and
torture or other ill-treatment in the context of sexual and reproductive health in Latin America and the
Caribbean, (2016) at 25–30, available at www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR0133882016E
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involved the death of a poor rural woman who was coerced by government ocials
into a sterilisation which caused her to develop sepsis and ultimately to die.82 This case
was the subject of a friendly settlement where the state acknowledged that its actions
violated the victim’s right to life, integrity and equality and agreed to several reparations
measures including compensation for the victim’s family as well as far reaching public
policy reform in the eld of informed consent and reproductive health.83 While the
Commission did not nd on the merits itself, the fact that it authorised a settlement
where the rights to integrity and equalitywere agreed to have been violated is signicant
for the purposes of this article.
Nine years aer that friendly settlement, the Inter-American Court handed down a
ruling where it examined the harm caused by a ban on in vitro fertilisation. In Artavia
Murillo et al v Costa Rica the state supreme court banned IVF because it involved
creating embryos in the full understanding that many of them would not survive the
process. The supreme court held that this procedure ‘clearly jeopardizes the life and
dignity of the humanbeing’84 and citedCostaRica’s obligation toprotect embryos from
abuse and death85 based in signicant part on the American Convention’s prenatal life
clause.86 The petitioners before the Inter-American System were infertile couples who
were no longer able to access IVF in Costa Rica and who the Commission claimed had
had their rights toprivacy, their right to founda family and their right to equality violated
by the ban.87 As the case required a nding on the protection of prenatal life under the
ACHR, theCourt re-examined and then rearmed theBabyBoyprecedent inmuch the
same terms as the Commission had found over thirty years earlier, and complemented
that nding with a survey of various sources of international law, in the sense that the
protection of prenatal life contemplated in article 4.1 of the American Convention was
not absolute.88 Interestingly, theCourtwent on to rule that in banning IVF the state had
violated more rights than those alleged by the Inter-American Commission. While the
casewas framed by theCommission in terms of the right to privacy, family and equality,
the Court added violations of the right to integrity and the right to liberty aer hearing
arguments from the petitioners themselves.89 Specically, theCourt found that the lack
of access to reproductive healthcare compromised the rights to privacy (in the sense of
autonomy), reproductive freedom and physical andmental integrity.90 It also held that
while the banon IVFhadbeen framed in gender neutral terms, it had a disproportionate
impact on women.91
The culmination of this trend towards nding Latin American states responsible
for restricting reproductive rights is found in the Court’s rst forced sterilisation case,
82 Case 12.191,Maria Mamerita Mestanza v Peru, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R, Report No 71/03 (2003) at paras
9–12.
83 Ibid. at para 14.
84 Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Costa Rica), Judgment No. 2000–02306, 15
March 2000, at 94.
85 Ibid. at 92.
86 Ibid. at 91.
87 Artavia Murillo v Costa Rica, supra n 4 at para 2.
88 Ibid. at paras 163–264.
89 Ibid. at para 141.
90 Ibid. at paras 147.
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I.V. v Bolivia, which was decided in 2016. In this case the victim was a refugee of
Peruvian descent who had been tortured by Peruvian authorities andwho, aer settling
in Bolivia was sterilised during a caesarean section without having given prior and
informed consent. The victim survived this sterilisation and was thus able to convey
to the Court the harm that she had su ered as a result of it.92 The Court took the
opportunity to examine the case using a sophisticated gender perspective that allowed
it to nd that many di erent violations of the victim’s human rights had occurred and,
importantly, that those violations had come about in part because of gender stereotypes
that oppress women and because of the imbalance of power that exists between doctors
and patients.93
The jurisprudential construction utilised by the court to nd that the state had
contravened the American Convention is interesting for the purposes of this article.
Most interesting in this context is that the Court located the right to autonomy within
the right to dignity (as opposed to the US doctrine of autonomy as privacy).94 Accord-
ing to the Court, a person’s right to self-determination and their ability to decide for
themselves is included in the somewhat di use and underutilised ‘right to have his
honor respected and his dignity recognized’.95 The Court then made a point of linking
this concept of autonomy as dignity with the rights to liberty, privacy, family life, health
and access to information,96 meaning that the lack of respect for the victim’s right to
consent or not to consent to the sterilisation was in violation of all of those rights.
It also made a point of nding that sterilisation without informed consent violated
all of the rights above in conjunction with the American Convention’s subordinate
discrimination clause, meaning that State had failed to respect and guarantee the rights
in question without discrimination.97 Further, the Court then went on to hold that
the forced sterilisation itself was cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.98 In doing
so it referred to the importance of understanding how discrimination against women
plays a role in determiningwhether theirmistreatment constitutes torture and/or cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. Crucially it held that:
Certainly, the healthcare context can involve a heightened risk that women may
be subject to of acts in violation of article 5.2 of the American Convention, espe-
cially with regards to practices and policies that are primarily directed at women,
that a ect them disproportionately, or that women are especially vulnerable to
due to negative or harmful gender stereotypes, including the social and cultural
assignmentof reproductiveduties andcontraceptive responsibilities towomen.99
Thedevelopmentof theCourt’s jurisprudence fromArtaviaMurillo to I.V.demonstrates
a progression in its gender analysis. It has moved from a focus on autonomy as privacy
92 I.V. v Bolivia, supra n 1 at para 269.
93 Ibid. at paras 185–188.
94 Ibid. at para 150.
95 American Convention on Human Rights, supra n 47 at article 11.1.
96 I.V. v Bolivia, supra n 1 at para 235.
97 Ibid. at paras 238–249.
98 Ibid. at para 270.
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and liberty to a focus on autonomy as dignity, which is an undertheorized right, whose
content the Court is able to shape. Likewise, it has moved from recognising the imposi-
tion of infertility as a violation of personal integrity to recognising it as cruel, inhuman
and degrading, all the while increasing the emphasis on structural discrimination and
gender stereotypes as the root cause of these violations.
While all three of the preceding cases refer to the unlawful removal of a woman’s
reproductive capacity, the Court’s evolution towards the construction of forced ster-
ilisation around the right to dignity, the right to equality and the right to be from
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, coupled with the preponderance given to
gender stereotypes in the adjudication of the case all suggest that the Court is willing
to recognise that the mistreatment of women in the arena of reproductive healthcare
goes well beyond their right to choose. Needless to say, this will be a key element in any
Inter-American litigation pursuing the decriminalisation of abortion.
C. The Requirement of So-Called Therapeutic Abortion
The nal set of cases where the system organs have taken action in the eld of repro-
ductive rights have to do with the availability of so-called therapeutic abortion. These
abortions are generally understood to be required for medical reasons to preserve the
health of the patient, including ending a pregnancy that is the result of rape. I add the
words ‘so-called’ because the term ‘therapeutic abortion’ suggests that all other forms
of abortion are not acts of healthcare. In fact, the term is oen used in contrast to the
term ‘elective abortion’, which would encompass those terminations that are the result
of a choice rather than a medical requirement. This terminology establishes a false
dichotomy that contributes to the understanding that most women don’t actually need
abortions and reinforces the stigma that surrounds them.100
The Inter-American System organs have been called upon to protect the rights of
women and girls who have been denied abortions despite their urgent need for them.
However, neither the Commission nor the Court have ever found on the merits of a
case regarding the lack of available abortion services; the Commission has endorsed
one friendly settlement and all other interventions have come about through the
system’s protective mechanisms, which are designed to provide urgent injunctive relief
to prevent further harm without deciding on the merits.
The friendly settlement was with regards to a thirteen-year-old Mexican girl who
was raped and who was subsequently denied an abortion.101 The fact that the state
was able to reach an agreement with the victim was likely due to the fact that abortion
was legal where the pregnancy was the result of rape. The issue therefore was not the
legality of the procedure but rather that the procedure was not available because state
ocials attempted to dissuade the victim and because doctors refused to perform the
procedure and gave the victim and her mother misleading information regarding the
risks involved. The Mexican state recognised its responsibility for ‘the absence of an
appropriate body of regulations concerning abortion’.102 It went on to agree to provide
100 Watson, ‘WhyWe Should Stop Using the Term ‘Elective Abortion’‘(2018) 20 AMA Journal of Ethics 1175.
101 Case 161–02, Paulina Del Carmen Ramirez Jacinto v Mexico, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No 21/07
(2007).






/hrlr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/hrlr/ngab014/6288575 by guest on 02 July 2021
20 • Can the Inter-American System Accommodate Abortion Rights?
both the victim and her son with reparations including the provision of healthcare
(including psychological care) various types of compensation, including housing and
educational support, damages, and legal and policy reform. While the agreement does
not include an explanation of the international legal construction of the human rights
violations at play in this case, it does provide an understanding of the harm caused
through the various reparations measures agreed upon. For example, the psychological
care available to the victim and her son were available at any time and the educational
scholarship for the victim’s son went all the way up to university.103 The reparations
measures considered in total indicate an understanding that the denial of abortion
caused long-term psychological su ering for the victim and her son as well as social
and economic hardship for the family.
Three years later, in 2010, the Commission issued precautionarymeasures in favour
of ‘Amelia’, a Nicaraguan womanwhowas already amother and whowas denied cancer
treatment because of the adverse e ects that chemotherapy and radiation could have
on her pregnancy.104 All forms of abortion are illegal in Nicaragua and no exceptions
are made. The Commission requested that the state ‘adopt the measures necessary to
ensure that the beneciary has access to the medical treatment she needs to treat her
metastasic cancer’.105 The State then agreed to begin the treatment. Strictly speaking,
this case is not about providing abortion care but rather about prioritizing the health of
the pregnant woman evenwhere treatment will likely jeopardize a pregnancy.However,
the following year the Commission issued a press release regarding its 141st Regular
Session, and in an annex to that press release it included a paragraph on the situation of
women’s rights in the region where it stated that:
The IACHRalso reminds the States that therapeutic abortion is recognized inter-
nationally as a specialized, necessary health services [sic] for women intended to
save the mother’s life when it is at risk due to pregnancy, and that denying this
service constitutes an attack on the life and physical and psychological integrity
of women.106
Two years later, in the case of B v El Salvador both the Commission and the Court
saw t to intervene to protect the life of B, a woman with lupus who was carrying an
anencephalic foetus andwhose pregnancy was threatening her life. Despite the fact that
all formsof abortion are strictly forbidden inEl Salvador, B’smedical teamhad indicated
that her pregnancy should be terminated.107 The case was taken to the SupremeCourt,
which issued an interim order requiring measures to guarantee B’s life and health by
‘providing medical treatment that is necessary and appropriate for the preservation
of those rights’108 while the case was decided. However, while B was hospitalised
103 Ibid. at para 16 (SIX).
104 CaseMC 43–10, ‘Amelia’, Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (2010).
105 Ibid.
106 Inter-Am. Comm.H.R. ‘Annex to Press Release 28/11 on the 141st Regular Session of the IACHR’, 1 April
2011, available at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/028A.asp [last accessed
12March 2021].
107 Matter of B, El Salvador, Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct H.R., 29May 2013 at para 8 (c).
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and given medicine, an abortion was not performed. The Supreme Court ultimately
rejected B’s request. Unusually, both the Commission and the Court intervened in this
case, through precautionary and provisional measures respectively, as the state failed to
implement themeasures ordered by the Commission. Neither of their ordersmentions
abortion specically, but they both request that the state urgently adopt all necessary
measures to avoid irreparable harm to B’s life and integrity.109 Six days aer the Court’s
order, the state carried out a caesarean section to remove the foetus from B’s womb. It
was placed in an incubator and given uids but died aer ve hours110.
The Commission also ordered precautionary measures in the case ofMainumby, a
ten-year-old Paraguayan girl whowas raped and then denied an abortion because it was
deemed that her pregnancy did not pose a risk to her life. Shewas hospitalisedwhile her
mother, who had requested an abortion be performed, was detained for contributing to
the abuse that the girl had su ered.111 In this case the Commission once again did not
use the term abortion, but it went further than it had in B by requesting that the state:
Protect the life and the personal integrity of the girl, in order to guarantee that
she has access to medical treatment that is appropriate to her situation and
that is recommended by specialists—in light of the technical guidelines of the
WorldHealthOrganisation and other similar sources applicable in the eld of the
reproductive health of girls and adolescents—and in which all available options
are ensured.112
The case garnered signicant attention from news outlets,113 human rights NGOs114
and UN ocials115 but ultimately the state refused to allow the termination and the
child gave birth via caesarean section.116
The preceding set of cases illustrates the core of the system organs’ position on
abortion. First, the fact that neither organ explicitly mentions the word ‘abortion’ in
the set of measures they require states to take demonstrates that they are aware of,
and perhaps wary of, the charged political environment that they are working in. The
consequences of taking a decriminalisation stance became shockingly clear when in
2019 the Trump administration withdrew over US$200,000 from the funding of the
Commission for, in their view, lobbying in favour of abortion.117 Second, the fact that
109 Ibid. at operational para 1.
110 Zabludovsky, ‘AHigh-Risk Pregnancy is Terminated. ButWas it an Abortion?’ TheNewYorkTimes, 4 June
2013.
111 CaseMC 178/15, ‘Mainumby’, Paraguay, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., (2015) at para 3.G.
112 Ibid. at para 23. My translation.
113 Pressly, ‘Pregnant at 10 andAbortion’s Not anOption’BBC, 10 Sept. 2015; Blair andCarneri, ‘It Destroyed
the Girl SheWas: The Toll of Pregnancy on Paraguay’s Children’ The Guardian, 19 July 2018.
114 See Guevara-Rosas, ‘Lucky to be Alive aer Rape and Childhood Pregnancy’ Amnesty International, 14
August 2015; EqualityNow, ‘Paraguay: Protect the Rights of 11-YearOld Rape Victim andGive her Justice’
18May 2015.
115 UNNews, ‘Paraguay: UNExperts DeploreGovernment’s Failure to protect 10-Year-Old Rape Survivor’ 11
May 2015.
116 Blair, ‘Paraguayan 11-Year-Old Gives Birth Aer Pregnancy Sparked Abortion Debate’ The Guardian, 13
August 2015.
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both the Commission and the Court express serious concerns about states forcing
women to continue with pregnancies in dire circumstances demonstrates that both
organs are willing to consider at least some forms of abortion as necessary to protect
the life and integrity of pregnant women. The question that remains is how do these
cases, together with the jurisprudence on prenatal life, forced sterilisation and the ban
on IVF, contribute to an understanding of the law that would require states to allow
abortion on demand for more women than just those in the direst circumstances?
4. BEYONDPRIVACY:WHAT STRATEGIES FORCHANGE IN LATIN
AMERICA?
Reproductive rights advocates in Latin America are looking to human rights discourse
to build an alternative narrative surrounding access to safe and legal abortion for
all pregnant people, beyond the limited options available in most states today. This
discourse has the virtue of claiming universality as one of its primary characteristics
and enjoys broad acceptance across the world. In particular, human rights doctrine had
a central role in the resistance to authoritarian rule that allowed the region to transition
to democracy, so it is a discourse that is widely understood and accepted.118 The
denial of abortion services is a complex violation that compromises several di erent
human rights at once and it may seem tempting to simplify this reality to make the
argument for decriminalisationmore accessible to broader audiences. There also exists
the temptation to follow the established doctrine of privacy, which has allowed for
decriminalization in the USA. My contention is that this would be a strategic mistake.
To be clear, the denial of free and legal abortion services is a violation of the right
to privacy, understood as the right to govern oneself with autonomy and to make deci-
sions about the body and about a life plan without undue interference from the state.
Deploying a narrative about abortion as autonomy sends a message about capability
that is important for feminists: namely that women do not want or need tutelage and
are perfectly capable of governing ourselves. It is important to recognize this but it is
also important to not reduce forced pregnancy to only the realm of privacy because,
as I stated earlier, this approach reinforces the idea that sexual and reproductive rights
impose on states only the obligation to not interfere.119 It also reinforces the public/pri-
vate divide and contributes to the stigma su ered by women who have undergone
abortions.120 Furthermore, it contributes to the perception that reproductive rights are
violated on a singular scale and does not facilitate the perception of these violations
as the result of discrimination su ered by women as a group.121 Furthermore, privacy
alone would constitute a relatively weak approach in Latin America, where people are
more accustomed to states that interfere in private life and where the Catholic and
Evangelical doctrine of the primacy of prenatal life is so strong. In this sense, if the
118 Eg: Sutton and Borland, supra n 58 at 35–48 (regarding the strategic use of human rights discourse by
reproductive rights advocates).
119 Harris v McRae supra n 35;Webster v Reproductive Health Services supra n 35.
120 Kumar, Hessini and Mitchell, ‘Conceptualising Abortion Stigma’ (2009) 11 Culture, Health and Sexuality
625; Shellenberg et al., ‘Social Stigma andDisclosure about InducedAbortion: Results from anExploratory
Study’ (2011) 6 Global Public Health S111; Hanschmidt et al., ‘Abortion Stigma: A Systematic Review’
(2016) 48 Perspectives on Sex and Reproductive Health 169.
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privacy argument is being so e ectively eroded in the USA, where there is a strong
support for autonomy and limited government, it would not stand well against the
protection of foetal life in Latin America.
In addition to privacy, a legal construction of the denial of access to safe and legal
abortion services in Latin America that is able to address the harm caused by this denial
would need to refer to at least the following issues:
A. Health
A signicant amount of scholarship exists that holds that abortion is healthcare.122 In
this sense it should be considered in the same way that the denial of any other medical
procedure should be considered, namely as a violation of the right to health. General
Comment22on theRight toSexual andReproductiveHealthby theUNCommitteeon
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers throughout to the requirement that states
decriminalise and provide access to safe abortion and holds specically that:
Preventing unintended pregnancies and unsafe abortions requires States to adopt
legal andpolicymeasures to guarantee all individuals access to a ordable, safe and
e ective contraceptives and comprehensive sexuality education, including for
adolescents, liberalize restrictive abortion laws, guaranteewomen and girls access
to safe abortion services and quality post-abortion care, including by training
health care providers, and respect women’s right to make autonomous decisions
about their sexual and reproductive health.123
Likewise, the World Health Organisation holds that ‘[l]aws and policies on abortion
should protect women’s health and their human rights’.124
B. Equality and Freedom fromDiscrimination
Abortion as an equality issue can be understood in three ways. First, the lack of access
to abortion services is product of the structural discrimination faced by women in
society. This structural discrimination creates power imbalances that oppress women
in many ways, one of which is the inability to control our reproductive lives or to make
unhindered decisions about whether and how we reproduce. One of the many ways in
which this structural oppression operates is in the proliferation of gender stereotypes
122 Cook and Dickens, ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quar-
terly 1; Hill, ‘Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights’ (2008) 18 Columbia Journal of Gender and
Law 1; Lindgren, ‘The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right’ (2012) 64
Hastings Law Journal 385. See also, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health,
UN Doc. A/66/254 (2011) at para 21; CEDAW Committee, Statement of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women on sexual and reproductive health and rights: Beyond
2014 ICPD Review, (2014) available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/State
ments/SRHR26Feb2014.pdf [last accessed12March2021];CommitteeonEconomic, Social andCultural
Rights, General Comment 22: The right to sexual and reproductive health (Article 12), 2 May 2016 at
para 40; International Federation ofGynecology andObstetrics, ‘Safe Abortion isHealthcare’ 27 Sep. 2019,
available at www.go.org/news/safe-abortion-healthcare-0016243 [last accessed 12March 2021].
123 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra n 122 at para 28.
124 World Health Organization, ‘Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems, Legal and
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surrounding the role of women as mothers rst and foremost, stereotypes which inu-
ence the decisions made by legislators, policymakers and medical professionals when
regulating the exercise of sexual and reproductive rights.125 Second, in most societies
around the globe maternity is associated with higher levels of poverty.126 Women who
have children tend to have smaller incomes, progress less and more slowly in their
careers andwork longer hours thanmen, and thanwomenwhodonot have children.127
The gender attainment gap that exists between men and women as a result of the
structural oppressionmentioned above is thus exacerbated by maternity.128 While this
is a problem that in any case requires urgent action from all states, forcing pregnant
people to continue with pregnancies they do not want to continue with also forces
them to bear the disproportionate social and economic burdens thrust upon mothers
which would compound the discrimination that they already experience as women. A
third, narrower, way to understand the denial of abortion services as discrimination
is that cisgender men are not routinely denied any healthcare services. In this sense,
the discrimination would be in the access to healthcare because ‘men are free to have
recourse to medical means to advance important interests in their lives’129, whereas
pregnant women, trans men and non-binary people are denied the right to terminate
their pregnancies. Cook, Dickens and Fathalla hold that:
Men are not legally compelled involuntarily to give the facilities of their bodies
in the service of others, for instance as bone marrow or blood donors, and the
legal requirement that women serve involuntarily for this purpose constitutes
discrimination against women on grounds of sex.130
C. MaternalMortality, MaternalMorbidity and Su ering
A more comprehensive human rights model of the denial of safe and legal abortion
services should also refer to the concrete physical and psychological harm caused to the
person who is refused an abortion. In this sense, understanding abortion as a choice
invisibilises the anguish and the pain caused by being forced to be pregnant and the
very real risk to life brought about by unsafe abortion. The concrete location of the
harm can be understood in two broad areas. First, the criminalisation of abortion
services, as well as the failure of the state to provide these services for free, pushes
women to seek illegal and/or unsafe abortions. It is worth noting here that the legal
125 Cook and Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives, (2010) at 85–6 (describing the
stereotypes of women in the arena of reproductive healthcare as ‘promiscuous or immoral’, ‘incapable of
making rational decisions’ and ‘weak and vulnerable’).
126 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social A airs, Statistics Division,TheWorld’s Women 2015:
Trends and Statistics, (2015) at Chapter 8: Poverty.
127 I understandwork to include not just paid employment but also caring responsibilities, including childcare.
See International Labour Oce,Women at Work: Trends 2016, (2016) at 19–21.
128 Grimshaw and Rubery, ‘The Motherhood Pay Gap: A Review of the Issues, Theory and International
Evidence’, International Labour Oce, (2015).
129 Cook, Dickens and Fathalla, supra n 19 at 351. See also 349 (‘men can serve their health needs, regarding
treatment for hepatitis and other health conditions, without fear of committing a criminal o ense’).
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status of abortion does not a ect abortion rates or a ect birth rates131 but in states
where abortion is restricted to only so-called therapeutic cases, a signicant amount
of maternal morbidity and mortality is caused by unsafe abortion.132 This was the
main claim made by reproductive rights activists who pushed for legislative reform in
Argentina: that women were su ering and dying because they were forced to resort to
unsafe abortion to terminate their pregnancies.133 The UNHuman Rights Committee
has asked states, when reporting on their compliance with the right to life under the
ICCPR, to include ‘any measures taken by the State to help women prevent unwanted
pregnancies, and to ensure that they donot have to undergo life-threatening clandestine
abortions’.134More recently it held thatwhile states parties to the ICCPRcould regulate
access to abortion services, they should not take measures that push pregnant women
to procure unsafe abortions, including measures that criminalize abortion.135
The second locus of harm in denying access to free and legal abortion is the physical
and psychological su ering and the heightened risk to life experienced by all those
who are forced to continue a pregnancy, regardless of whether they seek out an illegal
abortion. For some women this harm is considered by almost all states as too heavy
a burden to impose and thus abortion is permitted for those whose life or health is
threatened, those who are carrying foetuses with fatal abnormalities and for those
whose pregnancies are the result of rape. In these limited cases there seems to be a
large consensus around the idea that the physical and psychological su ering caused
by the pregnancy would be too much to force on anyone. But forced pregnancy causes
su ering in all cases, not just those that trigger so-called therapeutic abortions. Preg-
nancy and childbirth can be physically and emotionally dicult even if reproduction
is very much wanted and all pregnancies carry a heightened risk of death. This risk
and the common ailments su ered by pregnant women can cause severe distress in
those who do not want to be pregnant. There is also the psychological anguish that is
caused by the upheaval of life plans, the imposition of nancial and social hardship, the
knowledge that abortion is freely available to other women elsewhere and the need to
decidewhether to raise the child or to seek out adoption, both of which can bring about
enormous su ering. Childbirth is always physically traumatic and when pregnancy is
forced it can also be psychologically devastating. Studies show that forced pregnancy
and forced motherhood can have long-lasting psychological e ects on those who are
denied abortions and, on the children born as a result of forced pregnancy.136 It is
this su ering that has been largely invisible until recently. It is a su ering that is deeply
131 World Health Organisation, supra n 124 at 2.
132 World Health Organization, Preventing Unsafe Abortion, 25 September 2020, available at www.who.int/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/preventing-unsafe-abortion [last accessed 12 March 2021]. Regarding
Latin America, see: Guttmacher Institute, supra n 13.
133 Booth, supra n 58.
134 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (art. 3),
29March 2000 at para 10.
135 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, Article 6: right to life, 3 September 2019 at para 8.
136 Dagg, ‘The Psychological Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion—Denied andCompleted’ (1991) 148Ameri-
can Journal of Psychiatry 578; Gilchrist et al., ‘Termination of Pregnancy and PsychiatricMorbidity’ (1995)
167 British Journal of Psychiatry 243; Ludermir et al., ‘Postnatal Depression in Women aer Unsuccess-
ful Attempted Abortion’ (2011) 198 British Journal of Psychiatry 237; Herd et al., ‘The Implications of
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stigmatised, leading women to be very reticent to speak of it. It is also minimised and
trivialised by social narratives around pregnancy that are prevalent in Latin America
and that claim that all women grow into their roles as mothers and grow to love their
children in the end. Even if these baseless claims are true, the love for a child does not
erase the su ering caused by the denial of reproductive healthcare.
Human rights bodies around the world have been willing to call this su ering cruel,
inhuman and degrading when referring to the denial of so-called therapeutic abor-
tion137 but havenot generally come to the same conclusion regarding thebroader group
ofwomenwho simplydon’twant tobepregnant.However, the full understandingof the
su ering caused by forced pregnancy would require an acknowledgement that forcing
someone to be pregnant is cruel regardless of whether or not the pregnancy would
trigger a so-called therapeutic abortion.
5. CANTHE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEMACCOMMODATETHERIGHT
TOSAFEANDLEGALABORTION?
The rst premise of the present article is that reproductive rights advocates in Latin
America should seek to frame demands for access to safe and legal abortion in terms
that are broader than simply relying on the right to privacy (as autonomy) as this
argument is unlikely to succeed in the Latin American cultural context. Further, the
example of the USA demonstrates that the privacy doctrine is being intensely eroded
because it does not describe the full extent of the harm caused by denial of abortion
services.The secondpremise is that the Inter-American system,whichhasnot yet found
on the legality of the criminalisation of abortion beyond protective measures in cases
where women have required so-called therapeutic abortion, could provide important
jurisprudential guidance in framing the denial of abortion services as a violation of
human rights. Part of this guidance comes from the System organs’ opinions on other
sexual and reproductive rights and part of it comes from their established case law
regarding life, health, integrity and equality rights which all provide jurisprudence that
can be operationalised to support the decriminalisation of abortion services.
A. Sexual and Reproductive Rights
The Commission and the Court’s ndings regarding prenatal life, forced sterilisation,
IVF and so-called therapeutic abortion described above are the rst port of call in the
search for a path to broaden access to abortion inLatinAmerica. In particular, theCourt
has chosen to construe reproductive rights as broadly encompassing several di erent
human rights. It has evolved to locate the right to decide on reproductive health issues
as part of the right to dignity,138 meaning that to not allow a person to make decisions
regarding their reproductive health is to not recognise the full extent of their humanity.
Further, instead of isolating autonomy and consent only within the realm of dignity, it
137 Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations: Nicaragua, 10 June 2009 CAT/C/NIC/CO/1 at
para 16 (regarding the total ban on abortion that forces rape victims to carry pregnancies to term and causes
‘serious traumatic stress and a risk of long-lasting psychological problems’); Human Rights Committee,
supra n 134 at para 11 (requiring states to provide information as to whether access to safe abortion is
provided to those who became pregnant as a result of rape, when reporting on compliance with article 7
of the ICCPR—the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment).
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alsomade a point of linking autonomy to liberty, privacy, family life, health and access to
information.139 In this way, it created a nuanced vision of the violation of reproductive
consent that went well beyond the choice paradigm and went a signicant way towards
reconceptualising reproductive healthcare and its denial as a complex social issue. This
reformulation of reproductive health is an important rst piece of the puzzle.
Another important nding is that the removal of reproductive capacity (through
forced sterilisation or the ban on IVF) and the denial of so-called therapeutic abortion
both compromise the protection of the right to integrity and can involve its corollary,
the right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.140 In this sense,
all reproductive health cases that have been examined herein have involved the threat
to or the violation of the right to integrity contained in Article 5 of the ACHR. This
is signicant because I have argued above that a more adequate framing of the right
to safe and legal abortion in Latin America should include the assertion that to deny
reproductive healthcare is cruel. The current case lawof the systemorgans supports this
argument so if access to safe and legal abortion on demand is framed as a reproductive
healthcare issue, it is reasonable to suggest that the system organs could nd that its’
denial violates the rights to integrity as well as dignity liberty, privacy, family life, health
and access to information.
B. The Rights to Life and toHealth
The Inter-American system has some of the most sophisticated case law regarding the
right to life aer decades of adjudicating cases where death has resulted from political
violence.141 For the purposes of supporting the decriminalisation of abortion, the
Inter-American Court’s understanding of the state obligation to ensure the free and
full exercise of the right to life is particularly important. The Court, since Velásquez
Rodríguez, has held that the state has a duty ‘to organize the governmental apparatus
and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that
they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights’.142
Given the correlation between unsafe abortion and maternal mortality, the obligation
to ensure would require states to provide access to safe abortion services.
In addition, in the caseofXimenesLopes, where amentally illmandiedwhile interned
in a psychiatric institution, the Court held that:
As to the persons who are under medical treatment, and since health is a public
interest the protection of which is a duty of the States, these must prevent third
parties from unduly interfering with the enjoyment of the rights to life and
personal integrity, which are particularly vulnerable when a person is undergoing
health treatment. The Court considers that the States must regulate and super-
vise all activities related to the health care given to the individuals under the
139 Ibid. at para 235.
140 See supra sections 3.B. and 3.C.
141 See Cavallaro et al., Doctrine, Practice, and Advocacy in the Inter-American Human Rights System, (2019) at
chapter 6.
142 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, IACtHR Series C 4 (1988) at para 166 (dealing with forced
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jurisdiction thereof, as a special duty to protect life and personal integrity, regard-
less of the public or private nature of the entity giving such health care.143
Both of these rulings support the idea that under the American Convention onHuman
Rights, states must take positive measures to regulate healthcare services in order to
protect life, which in turn can support not only the decriminalisation of abortion but
also the state provision of abortion services.
Furthermore, assuming that the right to access abortion services on demand is duly
framed as an issue of reproductive healthcare, the Court has recently held that the right
to health is justiciable under the American Convention on Human Rights. This is a
remarkable precedent considering that the right to health, along with other economic,
social and cultural rights, has long been understood as removed from the protection
of the strongest international human rights treaties. In fact, article 26 of the American
Convention requires only that states ‘undertake to adopt measures . . . with a view to
achieving progressively . . . the full realization’ of a set of unnamed economic, social
and cultural rights. Despite this lack of specicity, the Court in 2018 found a violation
of Article 26 for the rst time in the case of Poblete Vilches which involved the death of
an elderly man as a result of surgery that neither he nor his family consented to. The
Court held in this case that the right to health was autonomous and protected under
Article 26 and that the state had violated this right.144 It also laid out the requirements
that the right to health imposes on states including the obligation to ensure equality in
the access to healthcare.145 Later on that year, in the case ofCuscul de Pivaral, the Court
again found that the right to health underArticle 26hadbeen violated, this timebecause
the state had failed to progressively implement the right to health in a case regarding the
denial of HIV medication.146 In deciding this case, the Court considered the rights to
health, integrity and life together.147
All these cases can serve as useful precedents in framing access to abortion as a
human right under theAmericanConvention. In particular, the Inter-AmericanCourt’s
consistent jurisprudence regarding the obligation to ensure the right to life through
positive measures, its willingness to consider the right to health as justiciable and its
willingness to consider the right to health together with the rights to life and to integrity
(see infra) all contribute to a framing of the issue of access to reproductive health
services, including access to safe and legal abortion, as a human right.
C. The Right to Integrity and the Prohibition of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman
andDegrading Treatment, Including the Recognition of a Life Plan
One of the most important areas where the established case law of the Inter-American
system organs can aid in the framing of access to safe and legal abortion as a human
right is in their sophisticated jurisprudence on the right to integrity and on torture
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Much like the Inter-American System’s
143 Case of Ximenes Lopes v Brazil, IACtHR Series C 149 (2006) at para 89.
144 Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v Chile, IACtHR Series C 349 (2018) at paras 100–118.
145 Ibid. at para 123.
146 Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v Guatemala, IACtHR Series C 359 (2018) at para 148.
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case law with regards to the right to life, this particular jurisprudence has been built up
since the beginning of the individual petitions process as the majority of the individual
petitions dealt with by the Inter-American system have involved political violence
that oen manifested as forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and
arbitrary detention. In dealing with case aer case of violence committed by powerful
governments against oppressed populations, the Commission and the Court became
very good at providing a legal and narrative framework within which to understand
su ering. Instead of copy-pasting rulings in cases that dealt with the same types of
violations, the Commission and the Court opted to examine the intricacies of each
specic case and to identify the nuances of each victim’s su ering. Therefore, Court
rulings—for example—oen include long descriptions of the facts of the case and the
e ect that the state’s abuse had on victims, they oen include transcripts or excerpts of
victims’ testimony and more recently they include expert testimony on how the state’s
action caused the su ering that it did. The System organs have taken full advantage of
the particular formulation of article 5 of the ACHR which, unlike other major human
rights treaties, includes the right to respect for a person’s physical, mental and moral
integrity as distinct from the prohibitions of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment that follow it. The notion of integrity suggests that there is a baseline of
well-being that should not be adversely a ected by the state. This concept allows
for a much broader understanding of su ering. The Commission and the Court can
and do nd violations of the right to integrity without having to satisfy the higher
substantive threshold required by a nding of torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment.148 Article 5 also expressly includes mental andmoral integrity which can be
broadly construed as psychological or emotional su ering. This concept has allowed
the Court to hold that the family members of the disappeared are victims in their own
right,149 that the placement of a detainee in the trunkof a car in andof itself constitutes a
violation of Article 5150 as does handcung awoman detainee to a bed151 among other
examples.152 With regards to sexual and reproductive rights, the Inter-American Court
has found violations of Article 5 with regards to sexual and reproductive rights. First, in
the Artavia Murillo ruling, which included expert testimony on the social stereotypes
of motherhood that heightened the su ering of women and men who were denied the
chance of becoming parents when the state banned IVF.153 Second, in the I.V. ruling,
which included an excerpt of the victim’s testimony where she detailed the extent and
the particularities of her su ering in the years that followed her forced sterilisation.154
148 See Cavallaro et al, supra n 141 at chapter 9.
149 Case of Blake v Guatemala, IACtHR Series C 36 (1998) at paras 114–126.
150 Case of Castillo Páez v Peru, IACtHR Series C 34 (1997) at para 66.
151 Case of Maritza Urrutia v Guatemala, IACtHR Series C 103 (2003) at para 92.
152 Case of Castillo Petruzzi v Peru, IACtHR Series C 52 (1999) at para 192 (the use of hoods and restraints in
a courtroom as well as poor conditions of detention); Castro Castro v Peru, supra n 69 at paras 319, 332–
33 (the lack of pre and postnatal care); Case of the Moiwana Community v Suriname, IACtHR Series C 124
(2005) at paras 94–103, 108, 126 (impunity surrounding a massacre, which was particularly harmful to
the indigenous community due to its belief that justice was necessary for the spiritual peace of the dead;
inability to properly honour the dead in indigenous rituals and; displacement from their ancestral lands);
Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay, IACtHR Series C 214 (2010) at para 244 (loss
of the traditional lands of an indigenous community).
153 Artavia Murillo et al. v Costa Rica, supra n 4 at para 298.
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In short, the Inter-American System organs have constructed a vast and detailed
jurisprudence on the violation of the right to integrity that is particularly sensitive to
individual su ering.This focuson the intricacies of su ering is not something that other
international adjudicative bodies have implemented. It appears to be part of the Inter-
American systemorgans’ commitments to truth and to justice born from their decades-
long work to address gross and systematic violations of human rights committed by
authoritarian regimes that relied on propaganda and the dehumanisation of political
opponents. The Commission and the Court’s insistence on revealing the nature and
the extent of su ering is therefore a way to return the lost humanity of the victims and
to restore them in dignity.
The Court has also developed an interesting body of jurisprudence when deal-
ing with cases of torture surrounding what it calls a person’s ‘life plan’, which it has
dened as:
. . . akin to the concept of personal fullment, which in turn is based on the
options that an individual may have for leading his life and achieving the goal
that he sets for himself. Strictly speaking, those options are themanifestation and
guarantee of freedom. An individual can hardly be described as truly free if he
does not have options to pursue in life and to carry that life to its natural conclu-
sion. Those options, in themselves, have an important existential value. Hence,
their elimination or curtailment objectively abridges freedom and constitutes the
loss of a valuable asset, a loss that this Court cannot disregard.155
For thepurposes of constructing ahuman-rights basednarrative surrounding thedenial
of abortion services, the fact that the systemorgans have previously found the alteration
of life plans relevant to understanding harm (even though they have not consistently
repaired this harm) suggests that they may be willing to do so with regards to forced
pregnancy.
I have argued above that the narrative distance between allowing women in dire
situations to access so-called therapeutic abortions and allowing all pregnant people
to access abortion on demand is in part due to an inability to perceive women who are
denied abortions as people who are su ering, because abortion has been construed as
an issue of choice. One way to visibilise the physical and psychological pain caused
to these people is to present their cases to a system that is uniquely willing and
demonstrably able to incorporate their su ering into an understanding of the law.
D. The Right to Equality and the (Now) EstablishedDoctrine on
Gender Justice
The nal jurisprudential puzzle piece that suggests that the Inter-American system
could support a claim that the denial of abortion services violates the human rights
155 Case of Loayza Tamayo v Peru, IACtHR Series C 42 (1998) at para 148, 147–154; Maritza Urrutia v
Guatemala, supra n 151 at para 168;Case of Cantoral Benavides v Peru, IACtHRSeriesC 8 (2001) at para 88;
Case of Gutiérrez Soler v Colombia, IACtHR Series C 132 (2005) at para 89. The Court has also included
considerations regarding life plans in cases of massacre and forced disappearance, Case of Las Dos Erres
Massacre v Guatemala, IACtHR Series C 211 (2009) at para 226; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v
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of pregnant people is the system organs’ progressive understanding of the right to
equality and their willingness to apply it in practice. This characteristic sets them
apart from, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee that has tended to apply
a narrow understanding of non-discrimination,156 and the European Court of Human
Rights that has been rightly criticised for its past reticence to examine whether states
discriminate at all.157
In a broad Advisory Opinion on the rights of migrants issued in 2003 the Court
boldly declared that:
thisCourt considers that the principle of equality before the law, equal protection
before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole
legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a
fundamental principle that permeates all laws. Nowadays, no legal act that is in
conict with this fundamental principle is acceptable, and discriminatory treat-
ment of anyperson, owing to gender, race, color, language, religionor belief, polit-
ical or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic
situation, property, civil status, birth or any other status is unacceptable.158
Given that the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination appear in
virtually all human rights treaties, including those that are almost universally ratied,
the assertion that they are also peremptory norms of international lawhas little practical
e ect. The importance of this statement is found in its narrative value: its assertion that
there can be no derogation from the equal protection of the law is surely valuable to an
advocacy strategy that seeks to frame the denial of abortion services as, among other
things, discriminatory.
I have argued in previous writings that the Inter-American Court’s turn towards
gender justice did not begin to manifest until the Plan de Sánchez Massacre reparations
ruling where the Court, for the rst time, recognised that women victims su ered in
distinct ways159 and the Castro Castro ruling in 2006 where the Court found gendered
violations of human rights for the rst time and where it rendered the Belem Do Pará
Convention justiciable.160 Since that time the Court has made enormous progress in
156 The UN Human Rights Committee uses a similar/di erence model of discrimination which compares
subjects and decides whether di erences in treatment are objective and reasonable. Human Rights Com-
mittee, General Comment 18, Non-Discrimination, 10 November 1989. See also Palacios Zuloaga, La No
Discriminación: Estudio de la Jurisprudencia del Comité de Derechos Humanos sobre la Cláusula Autónoma de
NoDiscriminación (2006);Vandenhole,Non-Discrimination andEquality in theView of theUNHumanRights
Treaty Bodies, (2005) at 43–62.
157 Harris, O’Boyle, and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (2018) at 803–
804; Goldston, ‘Race Discrimination in Europe: Problems and Prospects’ (1999) 5 European Human
Rights Law Review 462, 465–466. For an examination of how recent case law has improved, see Fredman,
‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the European Convention onHuman
Rights’ (2016) 16Human Rights Law Review 273.
158 OC-18/03, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra n 5 at para 101.
159 Palacios Zuloaga, supra n 2 at 275–7 (referencing the Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v Guatemala,
IACtHR Series C 116 (2004).
160 Ibid. at 277–285 (referencingCastroCastro Prison v Peru, supra n 69).TheBelemdoParáConvention refers
to the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
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terms of gender justice and is today at the forefront of its peers. One of the most
important precedents in all of international human rights law is the Inter-American
Court’s ruling inGonzalez et al v Mexico, commonly known as the Cotton Field case.161
The case, which was ruled upon in 2009, dealt with femicides in the border territory of
Juárez andhasmany salient ndings. For thepurposes of this article, themost important
are the acknowledgement of the structural discrimination of women inMexico and the
ordering of transformative reparations. The court found that the context of violence
against women that prevailed in the area at the time, the indi erence of state ocials to
this violence and their negligence in dealing with it contributed to perpetuating it.162
The Court went on to say that the violations of human rights evidenced by this case
required that the state implement transformative reparations aimed at changing the
prevailing environmentof genderbias inorder toprevent further violations.163Thiswas
the beginning of a jurisprudential trend that recognised that structural discrimination
against women was the root of many violations of women’s rights.
The trend continued with regards to violence against women in the case of Espinoza
González v Peru where the Court recognised gender stereotypes in the state response
to allegations of torture of a political prisoner,164 in Veliz Franco v Guatemala where
the Court constructed a narrative of gendered violence against women that went back
decades to explain how gender stereotypes a ected the police investigation of an
abduction and femicide165 and inVelásquez Paiz vGuatemalawhere theCourt held that
femicide required a gender sensitive investigation.166 In this ruling the word ‘gender’
appears 109 times. Since the 2009 ruling in the Cotton Field case, reliance on gender
stereotypes as a way to explain violations of women’s rights have transcended femicide
and now also play a signicant role in the abovementioned rulings in Artavia Murillo
and I.V. which deal with reproductive rights. The primordial role given to the principle
of equality alongwith the understanding thatwomen are structurally oppressed inLatin
America and the recognition of gender stereotypes as facilitators of the violation of
women’s rights, couldmake the Inter-American systemparticularly open to recognising
that the denial of safe and legal abortion is violation of the human rights of women and
other pregnant people.
The preceding overview of case law serves to illustrate the path o ered by the Inter-
American System to advocates looking to pursue the decriminalisation of abortion
in Latin America. While the System lacks case law that arms abortion rights per
se, it has copious jurisprudence on the rights violated by abortion bans that, when
considered together, make a strong case for decriminalisation. More importantly, the
Inter-American System has experienced a turn towards gender justice that has meant
that recent rulings are based on an understanding of structural oppression that is simply
not present in the case law of other domestic or international courts. It is this awareness
161 Gonzalez et al. v Mexico, supra n 4.
162 Ibid. at para 402.
163 Ibid. at para 450. However, as Rubio-Marín and Sandoval point out, the Court missed a valuable oppor-
tunity to operationalise transformative reparations in the ruling. Rubio-Martin and Sandoval, supra n
3.
164 Espinoza González v Perú, supra n 4 at para 278.
165 Veliz Franco et al. v Guatemala, supra n 4 at para 65–90.
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of gendered oppression that should make this forum appealing for reproductive rights
advocates.
6. DOTHEPOTENTIALBENEFITSOUTWEIGHTHERISKS?
Having argued that the Inter-American System could accommodate the understanding
that denial of abortion services is a violation of human rights, the question that remains
is whether activists should pursue strategic litigation before the System organs. Here,
the example of Roe in the USA is once again helpful, this time to illuminate some of the
pitfalls of pursuing policy change through strategic litigation.
First, strategic litigation that argues for decriminalisation of abortion by visibilising
a broad understanding of the harm caused by forced pregnancy (as opposed to privacy
as autonomy/choice) risks reinforcing the narrative of women as victims and the
social stereotypes that accompany that understanding.While this argument could seem
convincing, part of the problem faced by women who are denied abortions is that the
harm caused to them is not well understood or given the weight that it deserves under
the autonomy model. This has led to a trivialisation of that harm, which in turn has
allowed legislators and judges to continue to restrict women’s reproductive rights in
order to privilege the protection of prenatal life narrative. If the experience of those
forced to be pregnant is ever going to be understood, valued and repaired, we need
to stop hiding its complexity within the narrow connes of just one element of it, the
autonomy argument.
Second, some would argue that there is no textual basis to hold that the American
Convention protects the right to terminate a pregnancy, in much the same way that the
US Constitution does not explicitly recognise even the right to privacy, much less the
right to have an abortion. This could weaken the decriminalisation precedent. While
it is true that the Convention does not explicitly allow for abortion on demand, it
would not be the rst time that the system organs have demonstrated considerable
creativity in interpreting the Convention where it proved inadequate. Recall that both
the Commission and the Court found that abortion and IVF do not violate the explicit
requirement to protect prenatal life. The Court has declared that human rights treaties
are live instruments, which must evolve with the times167 and has not shied away from
updating the content of the American Convention. For example, the Inter-American
Court created the gure of forced disappearance inVelasquez Rodríguez168 and read the
human right to truth into the American Convention in Barrios Altos.169 More recently
it declared the right to health justiciable under the American Convention even though
that right is not explicitlymentioned therein.170 Furthermore, on at least two occasions
it rendered treaties justiciable where no textual basis existed.171 Most importantly, this
judicial creativity has not been met with much of a pushback from states; only two
states have permanently withdrawn from the Court’s jurisdiction in over thirty years of
167 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v Nicaragua, IACtHR Series C 79 (2001) at para 146.
168 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, supra n 142 at paras 150–188.
169 Case of Barrios Altos v Peru, IACtHR Series C 75 (2001) at para 48.
170 Poblete Vilches et al. v Chile, supra n 144; Cuscul de Pivaral et al. v Guatemala, supra n 146.
171 The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture in the Case of the ‘White Van’ (Paniagua
Morales et al.) v Guatemala, IACtHR Series C 37 (1998) at para 136; the Belém do Pará Convention in
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case law.172 That said, one could argue that states may not have pushed back against
the Court because there was no domestic lobby in favour of forced disappearance,
torture or violence againstwomenwhereas, in the event of a decision that requires states
to decriminalise abortion, the anti-abortion lobby could mobilise enough support to
compel states to withdraw from the system’s monitoring. Importantly though, when
states have complained about overreach from the system organs, and even when they
have withdrawn from monitoring, the Commission and the Court have not changed
their approach to the law.
Another argument against seeking this type of pronouncement from the Inter-
American system is that it would be more advisable for the Court to apply a margin
of appreciation to states instead of forcing change from outside. Some may argue that
this approach would be more democratic and ultimately more e ective in cementing
permanent change. However, it would be reasonable to say that, given the amount of
su ering that abortion bans create, time is a luxury that reproductive rights advocates
do not have, and the passage of time has not soened the abortion debate in the USA
since Roe. In any case, this distinctly European approach to human rights adjudication
was rejected early on by the Inter-American organs, which have consistently dealt with
states that have used political violence to govern. Interestingly, where cases have come
before theCourtwhich dealwith socially disputed issues (as opposed to repression) the
Court has continued to refuse to apply a margin of appreciation.173 When it comes to
determining state obligations under the American Convention, deference to states and
consensus among states are not part of the System organs’ ethos. It is precisely because
of the Inter-American System’s organs willingness to interpret the American Conven-
tion progressively, and because of their rejection of themargin of appreciation doctrine,
that this forum provides such a clear opportunity for reproductive rights advocates.
Having said that, strategic litigation is never a sure thing and activistsmay be reticent
to risk an adverse ruling before the Court. In this sense, a loss may set the movement
back years. Recall that some feminists in Chile were reticent to support the bill that
decriminalised abortion only very narrowly, because it did not includemost women.174
In that case, reproductive rights advocates preferred to push for themore restrictive rule
change because a more inclusive bill would not have passed Congress. The di erence
between that case and the presentation of a case to the Inter-American System is that
the System organs seemmuch more open to nding in favour of women’s reproductive
rights. In that sense, the gap to bridge is smaller than that which existed in the Chilean
congress. Another risk is that states may not comply with a favourable ruling, which is
a distinct possibility in a region where full compliance rates remain generally low. An
argument could bemade that smaller, incremental change domestically would bemore
e ective in the long term than seeking a favourable ruling from the System that might
172 Trinidad & Tobago denounced the IACHR in May of 1998 and Venezuela did so in September of 2012.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2018 (2018) at 9.
173 Regarding LGBTQ rights see supra n 6; regarding prior censorship see Case of ‘The Last Temptation of
Christ’ (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v Chile, IACtHR Series C 73 (2001). See alsoMcGoldrick, ‘A ording States a
Margin of Appreciation: Comparing the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights’ in Buckley, Donald and Leach (eds), Towards Convergence in International Human Rights
Law Approaches of Regional and International Systems (2016) 323.
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be ignored by the state and that might galvanise the anti-abortion lobby. It is important
to remember, however, that strategic litigation is never only about the ruling and never
only about compliance. Advocates in Latin American states that fall under the juris-
diction of the Court have long understood that win or lose, recourse to international
adjudication can provide much needed exposure to their positions. Where a ruling is
favourable to them, they have become skilled at making use of that ruling in ways that
facilitate domestic change regardless of the level of state compliance.175 Support from
the Commission and the Court can lend these advocates much needed validation and
canbecomea tool tobeused tomobilisedomestically.176 Finally, a favourable rulingwill
likely not change the minds of those that oppose the decriminalisation of abortion, but
it will provide authoritative support to the discourse that removes the decriminalisation
debate from the life/choice paradigm which in turn will bolster domestic advocates in
their e orts to produce change.
7. CONCLUSION
Narratives that situate access to abortion services as part of privacy rights have the virtue
of asserting that women and other pregnant people are best placed to make decisions
regarding their own reproduction. While these narratives have led to successful legal
defences of abortion rights in theUSA they have also been eroded by counter-narratives
that stress a prevailing right to life of the unborn.
In Latin America, where the cultural and religious context is generally conservative,
the privacy/autonomy/choice narrative does not appear to be able to stand against the
social construction of the unborn as requiring of protection under all circumstances.
Reproductive rights advocates that seek to mobilise for broader access to abortion
services in the region should therefore frame their claims in terms that recognise the
broad array of human rights that are compromised by such a ban. In particular, it is
important to visibilise the very real su ering that these bans impose on pregnant people
who do not want to be pregnant. A narrative that frames the denial of abortion in terms
of oppression and su ering could resonate in Latin America because the historical,
social and political context has made the understanding of other types of oppression
accessible to the broader population.
Once that narrative has been formulated, it would be useful to attempt to obtain
support from the region’s authoritative human rights bodies. In 2007 I wrote an article
that was critical of the lack of gender justice in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. It feels distinctly odd to be sitting at my desk thirteen years later writing an
article that suggests that the Inter-American System is an excellent forumwithin which
to pursue a ruling that declares that the denial of access to safe and legal abortion
is a violation of human rights. And yet here I am. Despite the System’s initial lack
of gender awareness and despite the fact that the American Convention explicitly
requires states to protect unborn human life, longstanding and recent developments in
the jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court strongly suggest that the System
could be well positioned to support a claim that holds that the criminalisation of
175 Palacios Zuloaga, ‘Judging Inter-American Human Rights: The Riddle of Compliance with the Inter-
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abortion is a violation of the American Convention on Human Rights. I have come
to this conclusion because the System organs are showing themselves as capable of
transcending the life/choice paradigm and are moving closer to an understanding of
sexual and reproductive rights that forms part of a broader concept of reproductive
justice. While strategic litigation in the eld of reproductive rights entails the risk of
loss or non-compliance (and while a favourable ruling will likely not change the minds
of staunch anti-abortion activists), it has the potential to provide reproductive rights
advocates with valuable discursive support and important tools to continue tomobilise
domestically.
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